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1. Introduction 
 
The company is equal in law to a natural person.  This is one of the cornerstones of South 
African company law, and has been since 1897 when the House of Lords handed down its 
decision in Salomon v Salomon and Co (the Salomon case).1 An important principle flowing 
from the Salomon case is that a company has its own legal personality, one which is 
distinct from its members.  It allows a company to perform juristic acts in its own name, as 
well as to sue and to be sued.  Further, members and directors enjoy protection against 
personal liability.  
 
Although this fundamental rule has a considerable influence in company law worldwide 
(including South Africa), it cannot be absolute and, as such, must allow for exceptions 
(where the courts may disregard the separate legal personality of the company).2 This 
paper will focus on the limited liability of the company and one of the important exceptions 
to this rule: piercing the corporate veil. 
 
This paper reveals, after a detailed analysis, that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil 
is inherently flawed. While accepting the necessity for such a doctrine in the context of a 
global market, this paper shows that its application in many jurisdictions, including South 
Africa, has proved to be problematic. The question that arises for consideration is whether 
the difficulties associated with piercing the corporate veil outweigh the obvious benefits of 
its existence.  Put another way, does the doctrine, with all of its flaws, bring about sufficient 
benefits to justify its maintenance within the South African legal system, or are there in fact 
other remedies to assist those seeking to hold directors and members liable for the conduct 
of the company?  This paper addresses these issues, and ultimately seeks to assess the 
prospects of the doctrine in respect of its permanence within the South African legal 
system. 
 
This paper begins with an examination of the doctrine of limited liability, its historic origins, 
the role it plays in international company law, and its various benefits. In light of the fact that 
veil piercing erodes the limited liability of a company, it is necessary to appreciate both the 
relevance and the significance of limited liability. If it can be argued that limited liability has 
little importance in a legal system, then courts would be justified in disregarding the notion 
in cases where fairness and equity are at stake. If, however, the role of limited liability 
                                               
1
 Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL). 
2
 EJ Cohn and C Simitis, “Lifting the Veil” In the Company Laws of the European Continent, The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, V 12 1963 189 at 189. 
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proves to be relevant, then courts would be justified in piercing the veil only in exceptional 
circumstances, if at all.  
 
Part 2 discusses the doctrine of veil piercing from a critical perspective. An oft-cited 
criticism of the doctrine is that it comes with no clear guidelines directing courts to the 
appropriate circumstances for piercing the corporate veil. This section of the paper 
illustrates the various approaches that courts have taken in deciding whether or not to 
pierce the corporate veil.  This discussion includes a critique of what is referred to as the 
“categorisation approach”, as well as other tests that have been applied in South African 
and abroad. Much of this section is buttressed by extensive case analyses, which is 
followed by a detailed look at both the advantages and disadvantages of the veil piercing 
doctrine. 
 
This paper will ultimately highlight the need for reform in respect of the doctrine of separate 
legal personality and, accordingly, will consider viable alternatives to this doctrine.  Such 
alternatives include how the courts could avoid invoking the veil piercing doctrine whilst still 
being able to grant plaintiffs’ relief, examining whether the legislature should legislate this 
area of law and, if so, how this should be done.  In addition, this paper will examine other 
theories to assist the courts with avoiding the use of the veil piercing doctrine such as 
Larkin's3 ‘entity theory’.  
 
 
2. Part 1 - Limited liability  
 
2.1 What is limited liability? 
 
The basic principle of limited liability is that the company has a legal personality 
separate and distinct from its members’.  Each can own their own assets and incur 
their own liabilities.  Flowing from separate legal personality is the more important 
notion of limited liability.  The company laws in jurisdictions with advanced 
economies allow for companies to carry on their businesses with limited liability.  
Accordingly, the most a member in the company can lose is the amount paid for the 
shares themselves and thus the value of his/her investment4.  As such, creditors 
who have claims against the company may look only to the corporate assets for the 
satisfaction of their claims as creditors and generally cannot proceed against the 
                                               
3
 MP Larkin ‘Regarding judicial disregarding of the companies separate identity’ SA Mercantile Law Journal V1 1989/90 277. 
4
 Prof N Hawke, Corporate Liability, London Sweet and Maxwell 2000 p108. 
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personal (separate) assets of the members.  This has the effect of capping the 
investors’ risk whilst, consequently, their potential for gain is unlimited.5  
 
2.2 The historic origins of the doctrine of limited liability 
 
At the start of the nineteenth century, unlimited liability was introduced in the United 
States of America through legislation.  This legislation was based on the belief that, 
without unlimited liability placed upon the member, there would be insufficient 
security for the corporate creditor and that, without this security, it would be difficult 
to raise the necessary capital required to operate a business.  In the 1840’s, the 
prevailing view changed and the consequent amendment to the relevant legislation 
reflected the view that, in order to further the provision of capital, formalities should 
be created to allow for members to invest in companies whilst limiting their personal 
liabilities.  Accordingly, the policy change limiting the personal liability of members 
encouraged the incorporation of companies, thereby stimulating economic growth.6  
 
The timing of the policy change could not have been better – the industrial 
revolution was a time when businesses needed capital and required substantial 
investment.  Accordingly, companies started looking to external sources for funding.  
The introduction of limited liability encouraged investors to fund companies through 
capital contributions as they could rest assured in the knowledge that their personal 
assets would not be at risk.  The investment in the capital of a company allowed the 
investor to enjoy his/her share of the profits of the company without risking more 
than the capital invested (as opposed to loan funding, where the return was limited).  
It became evident that the development of the capital market depended on limited 
liability as, while people were willing to risk their net worth in a company which they 
operated, they were not willing to invest in a business over which they had little 
control and did not operate or monitor closely.7 
 
2.3 The development of limited liability in South Africa 
 
The modern company in South Africa has its routes in the company legislation of 
1844 - 1862 as well as in the Salomon case.  The Joint Stock Act of 1844 simplified 
the process of and reduced the costs of incorporation, allowing for the corporate 
                                               
5
 Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (7Ed) London Sweet and Maxwell (2003) at 176. If the company is successful 
and is not liquidated. 
6
 SB Presser, Thwarting the killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 148 at 155. 
7
 Ibid at 155. 
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form to be employed by a wider range of users.8  However, this Act made no 
provision for the limitation of members’ personal liability.9  
 
Although there was no express limited liability in the Act at this time, a trend 
emerged in practice whereby a form of de facto limited liability was being achieved 
through statements in all contracts entered into by companies (either by creating a 
form of an insurance clause or by stipulating that neither the directors nor the 
members could be held personally liable for the debts of the company).10 
 
Limited liability was first given statutory recognition in the United Kingdom in the 
Limited Liability Act of 1855.  This Act stipulated that certain requirements had to be 
met in order for members to enjoy limited liability.  This Act was then incorporated 
into the 1856 Joint Stock Companies Act in South Africa.  According to the Joint 
Stock Companies Act, once all registration formalities were achieved, there would 
be automatic limited liability.11 
 
2.4 Limited liability and the separate personality of the company 
 
The concept of separate legal personality goes hand in hand with the doctrine of 
limited liability and, although separate personality was a consequence of the Joint 
Stock Companies Act of 1844, as discussed above, it took 53 years until the courts 
began addressing the implications of this separateness in detail.12  
 
In Foss v Harbottel13, the court confirmed the idea that when a wrong is committed 
against a company, the company itself would be the plaintiff in the proceedings and 
not the members.  This principle was later reinforced in the Salomon case14, where 
it was held that the company is a separate legal person, this being the first time the 
court asserted the separate legal existence of the company.  
 
                                               
8
 Cheong - Ann Png, Corporate Liability, A Study in Principles of Attribution, Kluwer Law International (2001) at 3. 
9
 M Glazer, Piercing the Corporate Veil: A Review of the Concept; and Consideration of its Relevance in South Africa Tax Law, 
Dissertation, The University of Cape Town, 1994 at 2. 
10
 M Glazer, Piercing the Corporate Veil: A Review of the Concept; and Consideration of its Relevance in South Africa Tax Law, 
Dissertation, The University of Cape Town, 1994 at 3.  This is similar to present day insurance contracts.  See below for more detail. 
11
 Ibid at 3. It is important to note that the Companies Act, No. 61 of 1973 provides for two types of companies, a company with a share 
capital, which can be a public or a private company, where Limited and (Proprietary) Limited will follow the name of the company 
respectively and a company that does not have a share capital. A company without a share capital may be a company limited by 
guarantee and the words (Limited by Guarantee) follows the name of the company.  Members’ liability in companies limited by 
guarantee is limited by the memorandum to the amount to which the members undertake to contribute should the company be wound 
up. See sections 19, 40, 52(3) of the Companies Act. See Cilliers and Benade, Corporate law, 3 Ed, Lexis Nexis Butterworths 2004, 
para 3.09. This paper focuses on companies with share capitals and not on companies limited by guarantee.  
12
 Ibid at 2. See Supra 1. 
13
 Foss v Harbottel  (1843) 2 Hare 43; 67 E.R. 189. 
14
 Supra 1. 
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In terms of the Salomon case, members of a company would not automatically, in 
their personal capacity, be entitled to the benefits nor would they be liable for the 
responsibilities or the obligations of the company.  It thus had the effect that 
members’ rights and/or obligations were restricted to their share of the profits and 
capital invested.15  The court, per the dicta of Lord Halsburg, held,  “Once the 
company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independent 
person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself, and … the motive of those 
who took part in the promotion of the company are absolutely irrelevant in 
discussing what those rights and liabilities are.’16  Lord Macnaghten stated that,  
“The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the 
memorandum: and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is 
precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons and managers, and the 
same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the 
subscriber…’17  However, the court made it clear that in the event of fraud or 
dishonesty being proven, the separate corporate personality must be discarded.18 
 
President Butler of Columbia University has described limited liability as the greatest 
discovery of modern times.19  Notwithstanding this view, there are some 
commentators who argue that limited liability can be subject to abuse, as limited 
liability is capable of manipulation (as was recognised as far back as the Salomon 
case)20.  Accordingly, there are circumstances where courts will disregard the 
limited liability of the company, such as in instances of abuse and fraud or where 
the company was used as an agent of its owner.21  In these circumstances, the 
disregarding of limited liability will result in the members and/or the directors being 
personally liable for the debts and other obligations of the company.22  
 
The extent to which one believes that the courts should or should not pierce the 
corporate veil and impose personal liability upon members will depend upon one’s 
assessment of the policy merits of limited liability.  As a result, it is necessary to 
have a clear understanding of the arguments both for and against the doctrine of 
limited liability.  On the one hand, if one is of the view that limited liability is 
unsound, one would then take a liberal view towards veil piercing whilst, on the 
other hand, if one is of the view that limited liability is a fundamental principle that 
                                               
15
 Supra 10 at 3. 
16
 Supra 1 at 30. 
17
 Supra 1 at 51. 
18
 Supra 10  at 3.  This will be discussed in greater detail below. 
19
 S B Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil s 1.01 at 1-5. 
20
 This will be discussed in greater detail below. 
21
 CM Schmitthoff, Salomon in the Shadow, The Journal of Business Law 1976, 305 at 306. 
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should not be fettered, one would be more willing to restrict and limit the use of the 
doctrine of veil piercing.23  
 
2.5 The consequences and effects of limited liability 
 
Limited liability can be said to protect the company and its members, as well as to 
facilitate commercial ventures in which the company may be interested.24  Limited 
liability encourages and attracts corporate investment.25  With this in mind, limited 
liability can raise management’s standards.  This can be done through an influence 
of corporate control which can result in greater transparency for corporate 
operations and can facilitate better investment strategies by the company. 26  
 
2.5.1 Historical Perspective – Investors of Moderate Means 
 
During the nineteenth century the importation of limited liability was designed 
to and served to encourage the small-scale entrepreneur.  A popular view of 
the time was that, without limited liability, only the very rich were in a position 
to invest in companies.  It was thus felt that if people of moderate means 
were disincentivised from investing, the economic process would be stifled.27  
In the United Kingdom, it was argued that limited liability would facilitate 
investment by middle and working class citizens, people who were otherwise 
discouraged from investing due to the high risk involved under an unlimited 
liability regime.28  Limited liability allowed for the entry into the business 
market being competitive and democratic and thereby facilitated the growth of 
an urban democracy through widespread participation in business and the 
opportunity for all people to acquire wealth.29 
 
A further consequence of limited liability is its assistance in the promotion of 
commercial activity.30  Limited liability facilitates investments from the public, 
people who are not professional investors, by encouraging the investment of 
                                               
22
 Supra 7 at 181. 
23
 SM Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. Corp Journal of Corporate Law Spring 2001 479 at 487. 
24
 Supra 6 at 117. 
25
 Ibid at 117. 
26
 F Easterbrook and D Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991), Chap 2.  
27
 Supra 8 at 155. 
28
 Ibid at 155 quoted from, Halpern, Trebilock and Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in corporation Law 30 U. Toronto, 
L.J. 117, 118 (1980). 
29Ibid at 155.  This argument is based on the popular democratic justification for limited liability. One must note that modern scholars 
rarely observe this.  
30
 JH Matheson and RB Eby, The Doctrine of piercing The Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited Liability Entities: An opportunity to Codify 
the Test For Waiving Owners’ Limited-Liability Protection, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 147 at 151. 
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surplus funds into large capital projects.31  As H G Manne said “[Limited 
liability]… allows individuals to use small fractions of their savings for various 
purposes, without risking a disastrous loss if any corporation in which they 
have invested becomes insolvent.”32 
 
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that limited liability will allow for a 
diversification of members, thereby lowering the risk of losing one’s 
investment, lowering the cost to members and allowing companies to raise 
capital.  Little or no diversification would result in a company having a 
diminished ability to raise capital as the cost of investment would rise and 
correspondingly the demand for such investment would decrease.33 
 
2.5.2 Monitoring Investments 
 
Connected to the argument of diversification is the argument of monitoring.  
Monitoring investments is expensive and investors generally have full time 
jobs which are unrelated to the investment.34  As a result many investors 
would rather not invest in an enterprise for fear of losing their entire wealth in 
an investment over which they have no control.  Limited liability allows 
investors to diversify their investments, as the risk of each investment failing 
does not extend to the investor’s entire wealth.  As such, there is less of a 
need to monitor and scrutinise all of their portfolios.35 
 
2.5.3 Monitoring Members 
 
Personal liability would result in creditors relying on members to be 
responsible for the debts of the company.36  Creditors of companies would 
thus be required to continuously assess and monitor the creditworthiness of 
all the members, resulting in increased cost and burden on the creditor.37  Not 
only would the creditors continuously monitor members but members would 
continuously monitor each other.38  Easterbrook and Fischel argue that 
limited liability reduces the costs of monitoring other members.  If there was a 
regime of unlimited liability then any one member could be responsible for the 
                                               
31
 Supra 7 at 177. 
32
 HG Manne Our Two corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 Va. L. Rev. 259 (1967) at 262. 
33
 Supra 28 at 43. 
34
 Supra 25 at 490-491. 
35
 Supra 32 at 156. 
36
 This is provided that the members are not jointly and severally liable. 
37
 Supra 25 at 493. 
38
 Supra 28 at 41. 
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entire debt of the company.  To prevent this from happening one would need 
to be sure that all members have sufficient wealth to bear their potential share 
of the debt if the company is unable to satisfy it.  Even if members are 
satisfied that their co-members are able to meet their share of the company’s 
debt at a particular point in time, they would be required to ensure that this 
remains the case by continuing with their monitoring of one another, to 
ensure that they do not transfer their assets or sells their shares to others 
who have less wealth than themselves.39  
 
Monitoring expenses could be easily limited simply by the legislator 
introducing legislation that imposes separate liability or liability on individual 
members in proportion to their investment in the company.40  Either option will 
reduce the need for creditors and other members to monitor the members of 
the company, resulting in members’ wealth becoming irrelevant41.  
Proportional shareholder liability is discussed in greater detail below.  
 
Based on the argument that the investors would need to monitor all other 
members in the company in the event of the members being liable for the 
corporate debts, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that limited liability allows for 
the market to assimilate information efficiently to price shares as pricing can 
only be done on the basis of information about the firm’s prospects.42  With 
unlimited liability, the task of pricing shares will be a difficult task resulting in 
shares becoming less tradable.43  Halpern, Trebilock and Turnbull, argue that 
limited liability facilitates the trading of shares at a uniform price.44  Limited 
liability facilitates the operation of public securities markets45 as the investor 
does not have to concern himself with the wealth of his fellow investor.  
 
Others argue that there is no basis for the above argument, as the need to 
monitor other members will disappear under a regime of proportional 
shareholder liability.46  The decrease in the need of creditors and members to 
                                               
39
 Supra 28 at 42. 
40
 Supra 8 at 160. 
41
 Supra 8  at 161. 
42
 Ibid at 161. 
43
 Ibid at 161. 
44
 Supra 8 at 177.  The problem with the arguments above, being in favour of limited liability, is that it is not persuasive for companies 
which have not, nor plan to go public.  
45
 Ibid at 177 referenced from, Halpern, Trebilock and Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability (1980) 30 University of Toronto 
L.J. 117.  
46
 Supra 8 at 161. 
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monitor members of the company, decreases risk which in turn allows for 
passive investments and reduces the cost of operating the company.47  
 
This argument may, however, be flawed as it ignores the origins and the 
continued maintenance of the limited liability doctrine.  If investors and 
creditors were in fact forced to monitor members under a regime of unlimited 
liability, the monitoring may well be done in a similar manner as it is done 
today, where brokers or management perform a monitoring function.  Thus 
monitoring could be done at the time of the initial investment and thereafter.  
Accordingly, if the potential return on an investment is high, investors might 
still invest by choosing their initial investment with regard to a track record of 
monitoring abilities or proven successful business strategies of management, 
- the decisive factor for investing would remain the profit potential of the 
enterprise.48 
 
It is important to recognise, on this basis, that the leading criterion for 
investment is to make a profit.  The same calculation is made under both a 
regime of unlimited liability and under limited liability.  The important 
consideration is the quality of the investment opportunity itself, and not the 
elimination of possible personal liability when an investor decides to commit 
his or her capital.49 
 
Others argue that creditors are able to investigate the capitalisation of 
companies, and reduce risk where necessary by adjusting the reward 
(through an increased return).  They can thus protect themselves against any 
increased risk that they might have assumed as a result of limited liability.  
Accordingly, it is argued that there is nothing inherently wrong with limited 
liability as creditors have other means of protecting themselves. 50 
 
2.5.4 Externalising of Risk 
 
A further advantage of limited liability is that it allows companies to 
externalise the risk involved with modern industrial enterprise and passes the 
                                               
47
 Supra 28 at  42. 
48
 Supra 8 at 159. 
49
 Supra 8 at 159. 
50
 Supra 8 at 157. 
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risk to the creditor.51  This is not, however, always the case.  In circumstances 
where the creditors exert strong countervailing power against the company, 
creditors may be in a position to utilise this power to force the company to 
accept a limit on the extent to which it can externalise its risk.  Where 
corporate financing is present (particularly where there is a scarcity of finance 
available to the company52), there is a likelihood that there exists a strong 
presence of creditors in the market, which could result in the externalities not 
being passed outside of the company 
 
2.5.5 Excessive Corporate Risk 
 
If a judgment is rendered against a company which is in excess of the 
company’s ability to pay, limited liability results in the judgement creditor 
being unable to collect the residual amount from the company’s members53.  
This can result in companies taking excessive corporate risks and unfairly 
limiting the ability of the plaintiff with a valid claim.54  This too has resulted in 
an argument for an alternative to the doctrine of limited liability.  
 
However, limited liability may encourage investors, through companies, to 
invest in risky projects that render high returns, as they are immune from 
personal bankruptcy.  If this were discouraged through unlimited liability, 
there may well be a social loss, as projects that might have high returns and 
beneficial uses of capital are risky and not pursued.55  Accordingly, by 
encouraging the most beneficial uses of capital and more risky investments, 
society as a whole could benefit56.  This may result in an increase in social 
wealth.57 
 
2.5.6 Free Riding 
 
Unlimited liability could result in free riding by members.  Free riding could 
occur whenever it is necessary to take contributions from a group of 
individuals in order to carry out a collective goal or purpose of the company.58  
The argument is based on the idea that members (the free riders) will not 
                                               
51
 Supra 25 at 489. Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman argue that limited liability gives corporations the ability to externalise tort 
risks, these risks can exceed the net worth of the corporation. Hansmann and Kraakman, Towards Unlimited Liability for Corporate 
Torts 100 Yale L.J. 1879 (1991). 
52
 Supra 6 at 117. 
53
 J Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 Yale, L.J. 387(1992) 387-88 
54
 Ibid at 388. 
55
 Supra 28 at 44. 
56
 Ibid at 44. These are investments where the potential gain is greater than the potential loss. 
57
 Ibid at 44. 
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contribute as they are of the view that others would contribute sufficient 
resources to ensure that the goal in mind would be met, thereby receiving the 
benefits of the collective activity without having to expand any personal 
resources.59  
 
2.5.7 Corporate Goal 
 
Originally, limited liability was introduced to protect members from the 
commercial risks that arose from the operation of a single company60.  
However, with the advent of corporate groups came the question of whether 
the protective framework could be transported to the newer group-based 
structures for the benefit of the member companies.61  
 
A problem that can arise under limited liability, with regard to corporate 
groups, is that each holding company of the multi-tiered corporate group is 
insulated from liability for unsatisfied debts of its subsidiary.  In the multi-
tiered group, there are thus as many layers of limited liability as there are tiers 
in the corporate structure.  Limited liability for corporate groups accordingly 
opens the door to many layers of insulation.  This is a consequence which 
was unforeseen when limited liability was adopted.62 
 
According to, Blumberg, the importation of limited liability to group structures 
undermines the very objective of the doctrine, as it overlooks  that the parent 
and the subsidiary company are collectively carrying on a common 
enterprise.  The business could thus be fragmented amongst the various 
components of the group, resulting in limited liability protecting each fragment 
from liability, and in this manner being protected from the obligations of the 
other fragments which in reality are part of the same business.63  
 
2.5.8 Conclusion 
 
It is thus clear form the foregoing that limited liability is most certainly 
essential to any sound economy and the corporate legal principles governing 
                                               
58
 Supra 25 at 491. 
59
 Ibid at 491. 
60
 Supra 6 at 118. 
61
 Supra 6 at 119. 
62
 Supra 6 at 139. 
63
 P Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge to Corporate Law , Oxford University Press New York, 1993 p 139 at 159. 
 Page 15  
 
 
it.  It is equally clear, however, that the doctrine of limited liability is not 
perfect. 
 
The question thus remains as to whether the principle should be adhered to 
at all times, bearing in mind its importance, or whether it be relaxed in certain 
instances.  In addition, it is necessary to consider whether or not there exist 
less invasive alternatives. 
 
 
3. Proportionate liability- an alternative to limited liability 
 
3.1 What is proportionate liability? 
 
Although limited liability most certainly performs an important function, it is 
necessary to compare it with other theories.  A popular alternative to limited liability 
is proportionate liability, which holds members proportionately liable for the claims 
that the corporate assets are insufficient to cover, pro rata to their equity interest in 
the company.64   
 
Under the doctrine of limited liability, if a judgment is ordered against a company, 
the judgment creditor is limited to recovering the amount owed to him/her from the 
company itself.  The problem that may arise is if the company’s liabilities exceed 
its assets, the company will be unable to pay its debts.  In such a situation, the 
judgment creditor is unable to collect the remainder of the money owed to him from 
the members personally as his claim is against the company itself 65  
 
Under the proportionate liability regime, if the company has insufficient assets to 
satisfy the judgement creditor’s claim, the creditor is entitled to recover the 
amounts owed to him from each member equal to an amount proportionate to that 
member’s equity interest in the company.66  As such, the balance of protection 
afforded under the law would rest with the creditor. 
 
                                               
64
 Supra 55 at 388. 
65
 Supra 55 at 387-388. 
66
 Supra 55 at 387-388. The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 Yale, L.J. 387(1992) 388.  The 
example the author gives is that, if a corporation is found liable for $1.2 Billion in delict damages, but has assets of only $200 million, an 
owner of 1% of the shares would be liable for 1 percent of the residual $1 billion. Whilst under limited liability the members are protected 
from any liability for damages which the corporation itself cannot cover. 
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3.2 The Effect of Proportionate Liability 
 
It is argued that one of the possible effects of proportionate liability, especially if 
applied to large publicly listed companies, is the decline in share prices by an 
amount that reflects the perceived magnitude and probability of events, which 
could result in exposing members to claims that are in excess of the corporate 
assets.  
 
Advocates of proportionate liability are of the view that this would incentivise 
corporate management to engage in activities that are less risky, as well as result 
in members purchasing ‘portfolio insurance’, which would protect them against this 
new financial exposure.67  This would in turn result in a decision-making process 
that would internalise risk, which would manifest in higher, more preferable and 
responsible, standards of care.  This consequence would result in a lower 
incidence of creditors’ claims, in addition to which there would be equitable 
compensation to the creditor, as more assets would be available to satisfy claims, 
as claims would not be limited to corporate assets, but would also extend to the 
members for an amount proportionate to his equity interest.68  
 
It is, however, important to note that the above is a theoretical argument.  
Proportionate liability might not generate the benefits that are predicted above.69  
 
It is further argued that those who advocate for proportionate liability have not 
done a careful analysis of capital markets as is required.  Grundfest states that the 
capital markets are extremely dynamic and may respond to proportionate liability 
by generating a large clientele of investors who are “de facto attachment-proof in 
actions seeking recovery of proportionate damages.”70  These investors can 
specialise in holding equity which is susceptible to third party claims, under a 
proportionate liability regime, whilst attachable members might hold equity that is 
unlikely to generate proportionate liability exposure.  This could result in 
transactions in the future, options or swap markets being able to reallocate equity 
market risk without shifting the proportionate liability exposure, thus leaving share 
prices unchanged from prices that would exist under a limited liability regime.71 
 
                                               
67
 Supra 55 at 388-89. 
68
 Supra 55 at 389. 
69
 Ibid at 389. 
70
 Ibid 389. 
71
 Supra 55  at 390. 
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Grundfest is additionally of the view that the result of the capital market activity 
would be a series of transactions which would arbitrage away the price effect of 
proportionate liability.  The resulting price would be the same as if there had been 
the traditional limited liability regime.  This would have the result of removing the 
price signals on which advocates of this argument rely, providing no additional 
assets on which the creditor could depend and which would insulate members 
from additional financial risk.  Accordingly, proportionate liability would be able to 
influence capital market prices only to the extent that transaction costs inhibit 
arbitrage transactions that synthesise limited liability pricing.72 
 
One must note that it is not only proportionate liability that is incapable of 
succeeding in light of capital market arbitrage, but that any member liability rule 
that is different to that of limited liability would most probably be capable of being 
subject to capital market arbitrage.73 
 
3.3 Delict versus contract 
 
Grundfest’s argument is primarily concerned with and limited to delicts committed 
by the company where the company has creditors.  The reason why he appears to 
be solely concerned with a delict and not with a situation where the company is in 
breach of or ill-performs under a contract is because when one contracts with a 
company, one is doing so knowingly and willingly, and with the company itself (not 
with its members).  
 
With a contract, the parties are entering into the contract with their eyes open, fully 
aware of the consequences of non-performance, including limited liability.  On the 
other hand, if a company commits a delict against a third party, such third party 
had no control over the situation and did not willingly allow for it to happen.  
Accordingly, it would seem equitable for innocent third parties to be awarded more 
protection, such that they may receive the usual delictual remedy of being placed 
in the same position they would have been in, had the delict not occurred.  A 
regime of proportionate liability might not provide for this.74    
 
                                               
72
 Ibid at 390. 
73
 Ibid at 390. 
74
 See Botha v van Niekerk 1983 (3) SA 513 (W). In this case this approach seems to be supported. This is not to say that proportionate 
liability could not be extended to breach of contracts, but rather that the argument in favour of the judgment creditor is more persuasive 
in such instances. 
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From the above it would appear that it is not prudent or practical to make members 
liable for damages which result from corporate conduct as the theory of 
proportionate liability has some inherent practical problems.75  
 
 
4. Further alternatives to limited liability 
 
Three alternatives are proposed to limited liability and proportionate liability, which are a 
minimum capital requirement, product safety standards and “gatekeeper” liability 
provisions.76  These three alternatives treat all companies equally and therefore do not 
generate artificial incentives to encourage companies to operate and be structured in one 
form over another.77 
 
4.1 Minimum capitalisation 
 
Minimum capitalisation is a requirement resulting in the establishment of levels of 
equity capital or insurance which must be maintained in order for the company to 
conduct certain lines of business.  This would include requiring the enterprises to 
have sufficient wealth to cover risk and to ensure that its actions are responsible 
when regulating its own activities.78  
 
Minimum capitalisation does, however, give rise to certain administrative problems, 
including the difficulty in setting the appropriate level of capitalisation.  Further, the 
prescribed capitalisation levels could require constant amendment in light of new 
markets and technology trends from time to time.  An incorrect estimation could 
induce a distortion in the market.79 
 
A benefit of minimum capitalisation is that it can be applied to listed companies, 
privately run companies as well as to domestic and foreign companies. It has its 
effect before the “capital markets even defines securities based on cash flow 
generated by these goods and services.”80 
 
                                               
75
 Supra 55 at 424- 425. 
76
 Supra 55  at 421. 
77
 Supra 55  at 423. 
78
 Supra 55  at 421. Minimum capitalisation is the backbone of bank regulatory strategies.  
79
 Supra 55 at 421. 
80
 Supra 55 at 421-22. 
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4.2 Product safety standards 
 
Product safety standards, whereby the legislator defines certain safety levels, could 
play a similar role to that of minimum capitalisation.81  Grundfest says that, if the 
regulators define safety standards, this could reduce the risk of events that threaten 
to generate liability in excess of corporate assets.  Importantly these standards 
cannot be avoided through capital market activity because, regardless of arbitrage, 
the market for goods and services, which is where delicts occur, is subject to these 
standards.  The problem may occur that, when setting such standards, mistakes 
may be made.  As with minimum capitalisation, a level of subjectivity is required in 
setting the standards.  Notwithstanding this, product safety standards would 
nonetheless heighten the standard of care that would be required to be followed by 
the company.82   
 
4.3 “Gatekeeper” standards 
  
“Gatekeeper” standards are strategies that impose civil or criminal penalties on the 
decision-maker of the company who played a role in the company committing a 
delict. This strategy is popular for dealing with troublesome corporate conduct as 
the management or directors responsible will become liable for this action through 
the imposition of liability on them in their personal capacities.  Not only will this act 
as a defence for improper governance but will ensure that, when the company is 
unable to pay its creditors, such creditors will not be out of pocket as they can 
recover the shortfall from the directors or management of the company.  The 
“Gatekeeper” standards solution may be regarded as being akin to Section 424 of 
the Companies Act, but with a lower burden of proof in respect of the mens rea 
element, or perhaps without the mens rea element being required at all.83 
 
 
5. Part 2 - What is Veil Piercing? 
 
Notwithstanding the relevant merits of the alternatives to limited liability, such alternatives 
remain, nonetheless, abstract theories.  In reality limited liability is entrenched in our Law, 
including the many negative and or inequitable consequences thereof.  Being cognizant of 
these, and in order to obviate same, our courts will, under limited circumstances, ignore 
                                               
81
 Supra 55 at 422. 
82
 Ibid at 422. 
83
 Ibid at 422. 
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limited liability and “pierce the corporate veil” such that the members of the company may 
become liable for the actions of the company, in spite of their separate identities and the 
courts treat the companies members as if they were the owners of the companies assets 
and as if they were conducting the companies business in their personal capacities, or the 
court may attribute rights and/or obligations of the members on to the company.84 
 
5.1 The Philosophy behind veil piercing 
 
A company’s separate existence is, by way of metaphor, described as a “veil”.  This 
veil is said to separate the company from its members and protect the members 
from those who deal with the company.  The corporate veil is a fundamental aspect 
of company law and is a protective device for those who exist behind it.85 
 
Pickering86 notes that there are two reasons why there are exceptions to the 
separate entity doctrine.  Firstly, he says that a company cannot at all times and in 
all circumstances be treated like an ordinary independent person.  An example of 
this would be that a company has no mens rea and therefore is not capable of 
committing a delict or a crime, unless the court lifts the veil and imposes the 
intention of the directors or members on to the company.  Secondly, if there were no 
exceptions to the separate personality rule, directors or members would be allowed 
to hide behind the shield of limited liability, with potentially disastrous effects.  
 
5.2 Veil piercing by South African Courts 
 
Because veil piercing is an exception to the rule of separate legal personality and 
not the rule itself, courts must be careful to permit veil piercing only in egregious 
cases.  Accordingly, in this area of law it is stated time and time again that courts 
pierce the veil reluctantly.87  
 
In exceptional circumstances the veil is said to be “pierced.”  When the court 
ignores the existence of a company, it treats the members as though they are the 
owners of the corporate assets and that they are conducting the business in their 
personal capacities.  Another form of piercing the corporate veil is where the courts 
impute the rights and/or obligations of the members on the company.88  Accordingly, 
                                               
84
 M S Blackman, The Law of South Africa’s ‘Companies’, part 1 vol 4, W A Joubert (Ed), 1995, at para 41. 
85
 Supra 6 p126. 
86
 Pickering, The Company as a Separate Legal Entity, (1968) 31 M.L.R. 481 at 483. 
87
 Supra 25 at 481 footnote 8.  
88
 Supra 86 at para 41. 
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veil piercing is where the veil of incorporation is ignored in order to determine the 
individuals upon whom liability should be imposed.89  It is important to note than 
when the courts pierce the corporate veil, they would be doing so only to determine 
the rights, liabilities and obligations of the parties in the instance before it and, for all 
other purposes, the company’s separate existence and personality remains 
unaffected.90  
 
In the 1980 case, Lategan v Boyes91 the court gave a judicial affirmation of the veil 
piercing doctrine and said that there is “no doubt that our courts would brush aside 
the veil of corporate identity…”92 The court went further to say that it is trite law that 
a court would be justified, in certain circumstances, to disregard the company’s 
separate personality in order to fix liability elsewhere.93  
 
It is further trite law that the disregarding of the separate personality of the company 
is not to be done casually, as stated in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling 
Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others94, “It is undoubtedly a salutary principle that our 
courts should not lightly disregard a companies separate personality, but should 
strive to give effect to and uphold it”95.  
 
5.3 Conditions for piercing the veil 
 
Although the law can interfere with the separateness of the company and upset the 
principle that every company is a separate legal entity with separate personality to 
its members,96 the question remains -“Should the separate legal statues of the 
company be open to scrutiny through the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil97 or 
should separate legal personality of the company be maintained at all times?”  
 
According to, Maurice Worm; “When the conception of corporate entity is employed 
to defraud creditors, to evade an existing obligation, to circumvent a statute, to 
achieve or perpetuate monopoly, or to protect knavery or crime, the courts will draw 
aside the web [i.e. the veil] of entity, will regard the corporate company as an 
                                               
89
 Supra 10 at 143. 
90
 Supra 86 at para 41 
91
 Lategan & Another NNO v Boyes and Another 1980 (4) SA 191 (T). 
92
 Lategan & Another NNO v Boyes and Another 1980 (4) SA 191 (T) at 201. 
93
 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others 1995 (4) SA 790 at 802 E. 
94
 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others 1995 (4) SA 790 at 802 E at 803 H-I. 
95
 Supra 7 at 189.  The veil piercing doctrine originated in the United States of America, and therefore has Common law routes. In the 
United Kingdom, the courts are willing to pierce the veil, but do so reluctantly even in the strongest cases, whilst in the United States of 
America the courts will pierce the veil with less reluctance.  
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 Supra 6 at 124. 
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association of live… men and women shareholders, and will do justice between real 
persons.”98  Accordingly, it is necessary to look into the facts of each case and to 
consider the substance rather then the form of the entity.99  
 
The legal personality of a company is a matter of substance and not merely a 
technicality.  Substance must not be cast aside for apparent convenience.100  
 
When the courts pierce the corporate veil, they impose a scheme of rights and 
obligations on the parties.  These rights and obligations are very different from that 
upon which they arranged their affairs.101  Accordingly, when the courts pierce the 
veil, the effect thereof is substantial and is potentially damaging. 
 
In order to pierce the corporate veil, it is arguable that there are at least two 
necessary conditions, which are required to be present.102  Firstly, there must be 
control and domination over finances, policies and practices to the extent that the 
company has no separate mind, will or existence from its members.103  This, on its 
own, is however not sufficient, as highlighted by Lord Haldbury in the Salomon 
case; “ If there was no fraud and no agency, and if the company was a real one and 
not a fiction or a myth, every one of the grounds upon which it is sought to support 
the judgement is disposed of.”104  Accordingly, a sub-consideration of this first 
condition that must be taken into account by the courts prior to them intervening is 
whether the company is being used for the purpose of fraud or as a means to avoid 
other legal obligations.105  Secondly, one must bear in mind that veil piercing is an 
exceptional procedure, and thus requires that exceptional circumstances be present 
before the court will pierce the veil.106  The general rule is that the separate 
corporate personality should be upheld, except in the most unusual circumstances.  
The consequence is that the court will pierce the veil only if the plaintiff is unable to 
obtain another remedy and which will result in him suffering a massive injustice107. 
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 Maurice Worm, Piercing the corporate Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 Colum. L. Rev. 496, 517 (1912). See supra 25 at 480. 
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 Supra 86 at para 43. 
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5.4 Legislation promoting transparency and accountability 
 
In certain cases, the legislation has disregarded the separate legal personality of 
companies in the interests of transparency and accountability. 
 
It is important to note that a fundamental aspect of corporate legislation is that of 
transparency of the internal happenings of the company.  This is evident in various 
sections of the Companies Act such as, inter alia, the requirement that the Articles 
of Association of the company be placed with the Registrar of Companies and the 
disclosure of the financial position of the company in its annual audited accounts, to 
name but a few.  By removing the veil, the corporate operations become even more 
transparent.  Those behind the veil become accountable for their actions.108  It is 
pointed out that transparency and accountability are differing concepts and the 
legislator has also created legislation to avoid the company from being used to 
defeat the rights of third parties.  
 
In various instances, the legislature has disregarded the principle of the separate 
legal personality of the company.  This is generally used as a sanction for the non-
compliance with the provision of an Act.109  
 
The legislature has demonstrated little reluctance in setting aside the separate entity 
rule110 as the legislature recognises that the benefits provided by the corporate form 
are capable of being abused by corporate managers or controlling members.  This 
is, however, clearly indicative of the route in which the veil piercing doctrine is 
heading. 
 
Set out below are examples of various specific provisions of local and foreign 
legislation which disregards separate corporate personality of a company and/or 
impose liability on directors or members. 
 
5.5 South African Legislation  
 
5.5.1 Section 50(3) of the Companies Act111 
In terms of section 50(3) of the Companies Act, if a director, officer or any 
person on the company’s behalf issues or signs a bill of exchange, a 
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promissory note, a cheque or an order for money or for goods on behalf of 
the company [or authorises the issue or signing of such a document] in which 
the registered name of the company is not cited in the correct manner, it will 
amount to an offence.  That person will be personally liable to the holder of 
that bill of exchange, promissory note, cheque or order for the amount 
thereof, unless it is duly paid by the company.  
 
5.5.2 Section 66 of the Companies Act 
 
Section 66 of the Companies Act provides that where a public company 
carries on business for more than six months while it has less than seven 
members, every person who is a member of the company during the time 
that it carries on business after those six months shall be personally liable for 
the payment of the debts of the company incurred during that time. 
  
5.5.3 Section 172(5)b of the Companies Act 
 
Section 172(5)b of the Companies Act provides that until a certificate is 
issued permitting the company to commence business any debts or liabilities 
incurred prior to receipt of the certificate is the joint and several liability of the 
directors and the members of the company. 
 
5.5.4 Section 280(5) of the Companies Act 
 
Section 280(5) of the Companies Act provides that if the directors of a 
Company fail to appoint an auditor to fulfil a vacancy after the receipt of 
written notice to do so by the Registrar the directors and the company shall 
be held jointly and severally liable for any debts incurred by the company 
during the existence of the vacancy.  
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5.5.5 Section 344(h) of the Companies Act 
 
In terms of section 344(h) of the Companies Act, a company may be wound 
up by the Court if it appears to the Court that it is just and equitable to do so.  
The actual state of affairs between the members may be looked at in 
determining whether the circumstances justify the winding up.112  
 
5.5.6 Section 424 of the Companies Act 
 
Section 424 of the Companies Act provides that, when it appears that any 
business of the company was or is being carried on recklessly or with intent 
to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other person or for 
any fraudulent purpose, the Court may declare that any person who was 
knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in the manner aforesaid, 
shall be personally responsible, without any limitation of liability, for all or any 
of the debts or other liabilities of the company as the Court may direct. 
 
5.5.7 Section 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act113  
 
Section 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act imposes criminal liability upon a 
corporate body for the offences committed by its directors or servants in the 
performance of their duties or while furthering the interests of that corporate 
body.114  Further, where a corporate has been held criminally liable for an 
offence, its directors may bear the criminal sanction on behalf of the 
company, such as incarceration. 
 
5.6 Foreign legislation 
 
It is valuable to contrast the legislation in foreign jurisdictions so as to contextualise 
the South African situation.  In this regard, the legislation of the United States of 
America is particularly useful, in light of its developed economy and advanced 
corporate and commercial legal system.  
 
It is not uncommon in the United States of America for federal legislation to have 
provisions that will attach liability to the members of companies for the acts of that 
company.  This would normally be in instances where an injustice will be caused to 
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the parties dealing with the company as a result of its separateness.  The wording 
differs slightly from Act to Act, but the common sentiment prevails. 
 
Similarly, in Australia, an example of this can be seen in s16 of the Canals Act 
1958-79 (Qld), in respect of liability for offence by bodies corporate: 
 
“1) Where a body corporate offends against this Act, each and every one of 
the following persons shall be deemed to have committed the offence and 
shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly, namely  
 
a) The managing directors, manager or other governing officer, by what 
ever name called, and every member of the governing body, by what ever 
name called thereof, and 
 
b)  Every person who in Queensland manages or acts or takes part in the 
management, administration, or government of the business in Queensland 
of the body corporate. 
 
2) This section applies so as not to limit…the liability of a body 
corporate…”115   
 
Thus, it is clear that foreign jurisdictions apply the principle of separate legal 
personality, but also limit it in certain circumstances (including in various statutes). 
 
5.7 When will the courts pierce the corporate veil? 
 
Deciphering when the courts will and will not pierce the corporate veil seems to be 
the most confused issue surrounding the doctrine, mostly because there seems to 
be very little consistency in the application of this doctrine by the Courts.  There are 
various tests which have been developed by the Courts and academics alike.  The 
predominant approach adopted by the South African courts is the categorisation 
approach (although some criticism has been levelled at this approach).  
 
The courts have made it abundantly clear that they have no general discretion to 
simply disregard a company’s separate legal personality on a whim if they feel that it 
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is just to do so116  Limited liability is at the heart of the reason for the existence of 
the company and cannot be done away with, without the most compelling of 
indications.  Therefore, as a general principle, it is incumbent on creditors to protect 
and enforce their rights and claims on traditional grounds, without having to pierce 
the corporate veil.117 
 
5.7.1 A common law examination of the tests and factors the courts have 
used when piercing the corporate veil 
 
General principles are important in any legal system as the application 
thereof ensures consistency and predictability.  Instances when the veil can 
be pierced seem to fluctuate according to the judicial thinking at the relevant 
time.118  The lack of a single, clearly defined principle has resulted in a 
number of overlapping lists of factors which the courts are to consider.  These 
factors have been passed off as tests.119  Whether an owner can be 
personally liable for a company’s liabilities based on these factors is, 
according to Hawke “questionable and at times completely unexplained.”120 
 
In Securitibank Ltd (No 2)121, Richmond P said: “It may be… that the doctrine 
laid down in [the] Salomon [case]…has to be watched very carefully  But that 
can only be so if a strict application of the principle of corporate entity would 
lead to a result so unsatisfactory as to warrant some departure from the 
normal rule… For myself, and with all respect, I would rather approach the 
question the other way round, that is to say on the basis that any suggested 
departure from the doctrine laid down in [the] Salomon [case] should be 
watched very carefully.  I think that is particularly so in a case such as the 
present where there is no suggestion that the individual corporate entities . . . 
were in some way used to create a sham facade.”   
 
Similarly, in Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Eudan Corporation122 
Corbett CJ held that the separate personality of the company and the 
members is of utmost importance and that deviation from this rule should 
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only occur in the rarest of cases.  Such cases would be where there are 
elements of fraud or improper conduct present.   
 
From the above, it appears that, the courts seem to be more willing to pierce 
the corporate veil if doing so will result in justice being achieved.123 
 
Similarly, in Lategan v Boyes,124 Loux J stated that fraud is the essential 
requirement for piercing the corporate veil and that a fraud committed by the 
company need always be present before the courts can pierce the veil.  
Blackman comments that in Lategan the court did not intend to lay down 
such a strict fraud requirement, as in Lategan there was no fraudulent 
conduct.125 
 
In Botha v van Niekerk126, Flemming J stated, that the statement in Lategan 
regarding fraud was incorrect.  Flemming J formulated a test for veil piercing 
which was somewhat wider than the categorisation approach127.  The court 
held that there could be personal liability if it could be proved that the 
applicant had suffered an unconscionable injustice as a result of what a 
right-minded person would perceive to be improper conduct on the part of 
the respondent.128  In such instances, mere equity is not sufficient.129  Based 
on this test, the court held that the Applicant had contracted of its own 
accord and put itself in the position where it was only the company that was 
liable. 
 
In Cape Pacific v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd130 Smalberg J 
commented on the test set down by Flemming J and stated that the test of 
unconscionable injustice was too rigid and that a more flexible test was 
required, a test that required the courts to look at the facts of each case.131   
  
In Hulse-Reutter & Others v Godde132 it was argued that the courts should 
pierce the veil in instances of improper or fraudulent conduct.  In this case, 
“[the shareholders] had caused [the company] to enter into the agreement 
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with no intention of [the company] ever honouring its obligations in terms of 
the agreement.”133  The court held, “There can be no doubt that the separate 
legal personality of a company is to be recognised and upheld except in the 
most unusual circumstances.  A court has no general discretion simply to 
disregard the existence of a separate corporate identity whenever it 
considers it just or convenient to do so.134  The circumstances in which a 
court will disregard the distinction between a corporate entity and those who 
control it are far from settled. Much will depend on a close analysis of the 
facts of each case, consideration of policy and judicial judgment… There 
must at least be some misuse or abuse of the distinction between the 
corporate entity and those who control it which results in an unfair advantage 
being afforded to the latter.”135  In determining whether there had been an 
abuse, the court looked at whether there had been a concealment of the 
identity of the members.136 
 
In Hulse-Reutter, the court departed from the Cape Pacific case without 
expressly stating so, and seemed to have reintroduced the requirement of 
unfair advantage into the test in determining whether or not to pierce the 
veil.137  Cape Pacific expressly avoided holding that there must always be an 
unfair advantage before the court can pierce the veil, as this requirement 
was regarded as being too rigid.138  This was, however, laid down as a 
requirement in Botha v van Niekerk139. 
 
Cape Pacific was decided on a flexible test and thus did away with the 
rigidity of Botha v van Niekerk.  However, the court in Hulse-Reutter reverted 
to a rigid test (without an explanation as to why it did so).140 
 
It is very difficult to reconcile Cape Pacific and Hulse-Reutter.  This is 
because Hulse-Reutter required there to be an “unfair advantage” as well as 
“no other remedy available”.  Larkin and Cassim have asked the question as 
to whether this is the better approach to dealing with veil piercing and have 
concluded that, if this is the correct approach, it may bring about the 
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doctrine’s destruction.  In this regard, Larkin and Cassim have stated “for 
what is there that can make any advantage unfair if there is no remedy in 
law against it?  Or, if an advantage is unfair why would there not be a legal 
remedy against it?”141  
 
5.8 Tests 
 
5.8.1 Good commercial reason test 
 
Courts have considered the test of “good commercial reason” - if it makes 
good commercial sense to have created a limited liability company , then the 
courts may not pierce the corporate veil.  However, with the ‘good 
commercial reason test’ an inherent flaw seems to be that any acquisition, 
formation or use of the corporate structure would always satisfy it, as it can 
almost always make good commercial sense to make use of the corporate 
structure.142 
 
5.8.2 Promotion of private interests / “alter ego” 
 
The courts have also used the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in 
instances where the controlling members do not treat the company as a 
separate entity but rather utilise it to promote their private interests.  
Accordingly, the company is treated as the “alter ego” of the members.143 
Beyond that, however, the Courts would only pierce the veil if it is in the 
interest of justice and fairness or right dealing.144 
 
5.8.3 The Control Test 
The “Control test” is allied to the “Alter ego test” discussed above.  In terms of 
this test, where the members of the company have control and ownership 
over the company and where they have domination of the financial policy so 
that the company has no separate mind of its own, the courts have pierced 
the corporate veil.145  In the Greater Johannesburg146 case, the court said the 
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control test is appropriate “for the purpose of deciding whether a public 
company is the “alter ego” of the government that established it.”147  
 
Larkin and Cassim state that, insofar as the control test is concerned, it is not 
control itself that will make the company the instrument of the controller and 
justify the veil being pierced, but rather the manner in which the control is 
exercised.148 
 
5.9 Categorisation in general by the courts 
 
Various categories have been established by the courts to assist them in the their 
examination of whether to pierce the veil.  These include “in the interests of justice”, 
“equity”, “fraud or improper conduct”, “under-capitalisation”, “formalities”, “the single 
economic unit” and “alter ego” or “agency”.  Matheson and Eby state that some 
courts will list all the factors and then attempt to synthesise them to the case at 
hand.149  
 
A thorough examination of the various categories is required to determine whether 
this “categorisation approach” is a successful method. It will become evident that 
these categories have inherent flaws and do not make for a very compelling 
argument as a means by which the courts can disregard the separate personality of 
the company. 
 
It is, however, understandable why the courts have tried to define situations, or 
categorise, where the corporate veil may be pierced.  However, not every case falls 
with in a specific category and, as such, it is necessary to determine whether the 
veil should be pierced by reference to the surrounding facts and circumstances.  
The criticism around the categorisation approach will be dealt with below.  
 
5.9.1 “In the interest of justice” 
 
The category of “in the interest of justice” provides the policy impetus for 
allowing exceptions to the doctrine of limited liability.  Thus, the courts will 
pierce the corporate veil in instances where it would result in justice 
prevailing.  The problem with this category is that the notion of the “interests 
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of justice” is vague and gives very little guidance as to when separate legal 
personality should be disregarded.150  
 
Case law provides some guidance in this regard.  In Botha v van Niekerk151, 
the court held that it would render someone other than the company liable for 
its debts if “an unconscionable injustice” had been suffered as a result of what 
was, to the “right-minded person”, conduct that was “clearly improper”.152  
However, the terminology used in this case is equally vague and subjective 
and thus whether further light has been shed on the issue is questionable. 
 
5.9.2 Fraud or improper conduct 
 
Related to the category “in the interest of justice” is “fraud and improper 
conduct”. 
 
L Gallagher and P Ziegler state that the second most commonly cited reason 
for piercing the veil is fraud.  The reason for this is that the courts endeavour 
to achieve justice for the parties involved.153  They argue that all the different 
categories which the courts use to pierce the veil are merely subsets of one 
category, the prevention of injustice.  The authors state that traditionally the 
prevention of injustice was merely a category used for determining whether or 
not the veil should be pierced.  This, they argue, is the exception to the 
separate personality of the company, with other exceptions being subsets of 
this general principle,154 as each of the categories are aimed at preventing an 
injustice to the parties concerned.155  Most decisions indicate that where there 
is an avoidance of an existing obligation and such avoidance would result in 
an injustice, then it would result in the veil being pierced.  
 
Recent cases have shown that the courts will pierce the corporate veil in 
circumstances where a company has been used to carry on unlawful 
activities, to avoid the impact of a court decision,156 to conceal a wrongdoing 
or to avoid obligations.157  Similarly, the veil has been pierced by the court in 
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instances where a person, having no legal power to act in his own right, 
creates the power by setting up a company and going through a “sham” 
transaction, so to empower it to do what he himself could not do 
independently.158  However, the courts will not pierce the veil merely because 
the device of a corporate structure is used to evade such rights or relief that 
third parties may in the future acquire.159 
  
Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal council160 makes it clear that the courts 
will pierce the veil if the corporate form is abused and used for an improper or 
unlawful use.161  In this case, the court held that if a transaction may “in truth 
be within the provisions of [a] statute, but the parties may call it by a name or 
cloak it in a guise, calculated to escape those provisions…the court would 
strip off its form and disclose its real nature and the law would operate.” 
 
In Lategan v Boyes,162 the courts pierced the veil where there existed fraud.  
In this case, the company was held liable for the obligations of the member.163  
 
It is not unlikely for a company to carry on its affairs and to avoid being 
subject to certain pieces of legislation.  This does not mean that a person 
may not deliberately arrange his affairs in order to avoid being hit by the 
statutory provisions.164  If a person does arrange his affairs “and honestly 
intends what he has done to have effect according to its tender, the only 
question will be whether what he has done falls within or without those 
provisions.”  But when it is done in a way so that the company can do 
something which the person is, in his own capacity, prohibited from doing via 
statute, then the courts can treat the acts of the company as the acts of the 
person.165 
 
It is accordingly well established that the courts will pierce the veil where the 
company is used for fraudulent means, or as a means to evade contractual or 
legal obligations.166  The problem is that this exception which was mentioned 
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in the Salomon case is not as straight forward as it seems and can become 
confused.167  
 
Hawke and Payne both note that timing and motivation are important with 
regards to the fraud category, but that they cannot be over simplified.  This is 
due to the complex nature of commercial and related arrangements.168  There 
will generally be a connection between the two.  Motive has been held to be 
of relevance in Adams169, Tjaskemotesrs170, Gilford Motors Co171 and Jones v 
Lipman and Ringway172  But Hawke says motive begs the question about the 
nature and purpose behind the use of the corporate form173 and the objective 
of the arrangement. 
 
Firstly, one needs to consider whether the motive of the person who is 
practising the deception is of any relevance.174  In Adams, Slade LJ held that 
one must look to see if the company is a façade which is concealing the true 
facts.175  Slade LJ said that with such a test the “motive of the perpetrator 
may be highly material.”176  The difficulty here is trying to ascertain what those 
motives need to be.177 
 
In an analysis of Gilford Motors178 and Jones v Lipman and Ringway 179, it is 
noteworthy that, in both cases, the defendant intended to deceive the 
plaintiffs, thus denying the plaintiffs their legal rights by using a corporate 
form. Is such a motive necessary for the fraud exception to be applicable?180  
In the Adams case, there was no evidence of unlawful intentional behaviour 
to deny the plaintiff rights which had already come into existence.181  Thus the 
question is “Is it enough for the defendant to intend to set up a company and 
intend thereby to create a smoke screen between himself and the 
plaintiff…but without intending to deny the plaintiff of any legal rights” for the 
                                               
167
 Ibid at 284. 
168
 Supra 6 at 149. 
169
 Supra 159. 
170
 Tjaskemolen [1997] 2 L.I. rep. 465. 
171
 Supra 163. 
172
 Jones v Lipman Ringway [1998] 2 B.C.L.C, 625. 
173
 Supra 6 at 149. 
174
 Supra 120 at 286. 
175
 Supra 159 at 539. 
176
 Ibid at 542. 
177
 Supra 120 at 286. 
178
 Supra 163. 
179
 Supra 174. 
180
 Supra 120 at 286. 
181
 Supra 120 at 286-87. 
 Page 35  
 
 
fraud exception to be applicable?182  This, says Payne, is a question which 
goes to the quality of the right.  The court in Adams appears to have been 
correct in stating that motive was relevant, but without any further guidance, 
this statement is unhelpful.183 
 
Secondly, one needs to consider whether or not the nature of the obligation 
will have any effect as to whether the courts will pierce the veil.  Payne states 
that, in order for the fraud exception to succeed, there needs to be a pre-
existing legal right.  Thus, if such a pre-existing legal right is not in existence, 
the intention to deceive the plaintiff is purely speculative.  “If the legal right 
crystallises before the corporate form is used to evade the right, then all is 
well and good because the defendant intends to use the company to deny the 
plaintiff that legal right, and the mental element is satisfied.”184  If the legal 
right was established only after the company has been formed, then the 
mental element would be impossible to satisfy.185 
 
Thirdly one needs to consider whether the time of incorporation of the 
company is of any relevance in ascertaining fraud.  In Creasey v Breachwood 
Motors Ltd186 the argument based on fraud was unsuccessful due to the 
timing of the incorporation of the “sham” company.187  The court noted, in the 
Creasey case, that the company was in existence and carrying on its 
business as opposed to being formed purely to carry out the fraud. 
 
Payne states, however, that it should be irrelevant whether the company was 
in existence prior to the fraud, but simply if at some stage there was in fact a 
fraud committed.188  As long as there is “the intention to use the corporate 
structure in such a way as to deny the plaintiff some pre-existing legal 
right,”189 then the fraud exception can be invoked.  The “sham” company 
should not need to be incorporated purely for the purpose of committing the 
fraud.190  
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5.9.2.1 Examples through Case Law 
 
Case law provides example of where the corporate veil has been 
pierced in instances of fraudulent or dishonest conduct.  It is 
necessary to examine these cases to provide some guidance as 
to the case-by-case analysis conducted by the courts in piercing 
the corporate veil. 
 
In Robinson v Randfontein Estate Gold Mining Co Ltd191, a 
director of a company (A Co) bought property with the intention 
of selling it to (A Co) at a profit.  In order to avoid being in breach 
of his director’s fiduciary duties, he set up a company (Y Co), to 
whom he would sell the property. (Y Co) would then sell it to (A 
Co). In this case, the court disregarded the intermediary 
company and pierced the corporate veil. 
 
In Re a Company192, a network of interrelated companies had 
been established and structured so that the companies’ assets 
would be placed beyond the hands of the creditors. In this 
instance, the courts pierced the corporate veil. 
 
In Re H193 the court noted that there was evidence that the 
company, which was controlled by the applicant, was prima facie 
a cloak for criminal activity.  Accordingly, the court pierced the 
corporate veil to allow for the assets of the company to be 
treated as though they were assets of the applicant. 
 
In Gilford Motors194, the court was concerned with a restraint of 
trade clause.  The former employee set up a company and 
solicited customers through this newly formed company in an 
attempt to circumvent his obligations under and in terms of the 
restraint.  The court held the company to be a “sham” or a 
“cloak” and thus restrained the company from acting as it did. 
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In J Louw and Co (Pty) Ltd v Richter195, a case also concerned 
with a restraint of trade clause, Ditcott J refused to follow the 
decision in Gilford Motors and said that “to call Richter to book 
for his own transactions channelled through the company was 
one thing,” but to treat the company “as if it had incurred an 
obligation which it never did, an obligation which [the member] 
instead incurred at a time when [the member] had no connection 
with it because it did not yet exist, is surely another.”196  The 
court said that the company, in this case, was established 
innocently, whilst in Gilford Motors it was established so that it 
could do what the member was not at liberty to do personally.197 
 
In Die Dros (Pty) Ltd and Another v Telefan Beverages CC and 
Others,198 another restraint of trade case, there was a clause 
which prohibited a franchisee (X) from carrying on a restaurant 
business for a 12 month period within a certain region upon 
termination of the franchise agreement. Notwithstanding this, (X) 
became involved in a business called ‘De Kelder Restaurant’ 
which operated as a close corporation (the interest in which was 
held by (Y), (X’s) brother).  The court noted that it is trite law that 
the courts could pierce the corporate veil in cases of breach of 
restraint of trade clauses, this being on the condition that it could 
be proven that the close corporation was being used as a front to 
engage in activities that were otherwise prohibited.  In the case 
at hand, the court found that there were insufficient facts to show 
that the close corporation was being used as an instrument of 
business to promote the personal affairs of X.199 
 
In Tjaskemolen200, the company (Bayland Navigation, part of the 
Fandel Group), was formed for the sole purpose of owning the 
ship Bayland.  The ship was sold to Golden International 
Navigation SA, another company within the group.  The ship was 
then attached as security, but it was argued that the ship no 
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longer belonged to Bayland Navigation.  The court held that the 
arrangement was a sham to avoid the arrest of the vessel, that 
there was no genuine commercial transaction and that it was not 
intended that Golden International Navigation should pay the full 
purchase price.  The court thus looked at motive and intention, 
and pierced the corporate veil. 
 
In Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber201, a person rendered services to 
another through a corporate and received payment through that 
corporate.  Notwithstanding this, she was nonetheless deemed 
to be an employee of the company to which she was rendering 
services by the court. The court held that, “the mere fact that use 
has been made of a legal entity …to provide services is no bar to 
a conclusion that someone who is part of the company…or who 
owns the company …contractually obligated to provide such 
services to the alleged employer is an employee of the company 
contractually entitled to receive such services.”202.  The learned 
judge went on to say, “I propose to determine this [case] having 
regard to the realities, to substance rather than form and to the 
true relationship rather than the appearance of the 
relationship.”203 
 
There is some foreign case law that indicates that the veil can be 
pierced even in instances where there is no fraud or agency.  
Such an example is R v Hammersmith and Fulham London 
Borough Council, ex parte People Before Profit 204, where there 
was no use of the company as an “alter ego”, nor was there 
fraud present, yet the court still pierced the corporate veil.  The 
reasoning as to why the veil was pierced seemed to be that the 
twin test of “alter ego” and fraud would only be applicable in 
situations where the application to have the veil pierced is made 
by someone outside of the company.  However, if the request is 
made by someone inside of the company it would seem as 
though these tests would not be of much use.205 
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It is thus apparent that the courts will disregard the limited liability 
of a company when the company is merely a sham and is 
concealing the true facts.206  The problem is, however, in 
identifying what it is exactly that makes the company a mere 
façade.207  English courts have noted208 that there is little 
guidance in deciding whether or not a company is a façade.  
Although fraud is a well established category for piercing the veil, 
it is also evident that this category is not easy to apply in 
practice, having regard to the difficulties with the issues such as 
motive and intention. 
 
5.9.3 Equity 
 
Benade argues that the separation between companies and its members 
would not be in violation of company law if the separation of the two were for 
reasons of equity.209  
 
The equity argument has two elements.  Firstly, the policy based argument, 
that it is unfair to allow the owners of the company to avoid debts at the 
expense of the creditors of the company.  Secondly, the allegation that the 
owner acted fraudulently or that he disposed of the company’s assets so as 
to prejudice the company and the creditors.210  
 
According to Matheson and Eby, the first element contradicts commercial 
activity because once it is accepted that the law acknowledges that a 
company can have limited liability, “then the perceived unfairness to creditors 
should not be either a subject of judicial discussion or the basis of a decision 
to waiver an owner’s statutory limited liability.”211  The second element shows 
that the “equity” category may not be separate from the “fraud” category 
(although, it is acknowledged that the courts have looked at equitable 
solutions in arriving at decisions).  Matheson and Eby note that any court that 
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is basing its decisions on equity will disregard the limited liability of an entity, 
the reason being that the very concept of limited liability is inequitable.212  
 
While some courts use equity as a gloss when considering the “alter ego” 
category, other courts have pierced the corporate veil based on equitable 
situations alone.213  
 
5.9.4 Undercapitalisation 
 
There is no authority in South Africa allowing the courts to pierce the 
corporate veil in circumstances where a company has insufficient capital.  
Some authors are of the view that there is no reason as to why the courts 
should be prohibited from piercing the corporate veil for this reason.  The 
courts in the United States of America have made use of this category214 and 
have pierced the veil in circumstances where a company is incorporated with 
insufficient funds to satisfy creditors if debts become due and payable. 
 
The problem with the above category is if one is to deprive a small business 
owner of the protection of limited liability due to his/her indebtedness, it would 
be contrary to the very existence of limited liability and would be contrary to 
efficient business practice.215  When a company has debt that is in excess of 
its assets, holding the member personally liable fails to take into account that 
most businesses are very highly leveraged.216  Further, from the first day of 
operation, it is not uncommon for a company to have insufficient assets to 
cover all of its debts.217  
 
The requirement for a newly incorporated company to have sufficient capital 
to cover all its debts will result in entrepreneurial markets being closed, 
defeating one of the main objectives behind limited liability.  If the courts set 
minimum standards ensuring that creditors would be sufficiently covered this 
would operate as a bar to those who want to join the market.218 
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It makes very little business sense to put more money than is necessary into 
a new company, as the greater the amount of capital investment into a 
company, the smaller the return on equity, resulting in a less successful 
investment. It seems illogical to penalise business owners for operating their 
business with business acumen.219  Accordingly, a balance needs to be 
struck between a business environment that facilitates economic growth, 
whilst protecting the rights of participants therein. 
 
5.9.5 Formalities  
 
Procedures which the corporate members must follow are set out in 
legislation and specifically in the Companies Act.  Most of the procedures are 
in place to protect the members from mistreatment by the directors or the 
owners.220  Notwithstanding this, the courts have, in some cases, disregarded 
the separate legal personality of a company in cases where the members 
have failed to comply with corporate formalities. 
 
The courts often justify piercing the corporate veil on the failure to comply 
with corporate formalities on the basis of either ‘privilege’ or ‘quid pro quo’.  
This is based on the assumption that an owner’s failure to comply with the 
statutory requirements is an indication of the owner’s lack of respect for the 
separation which is demanded by the law, which is the basis of their limited 
liability and is an indication of whether the individuals who are involved 
actually see the company as a separate entity.221  
 
The assumption has been argued to be incorrect in situations where the veil 
is pierced where there are small groups of owners.222  These owners are 
often over-worked and tend to overlook the formalities that are of no 
importance to the actual operation of the business.  Further, they, the 
business owners, are not legally trained, and are unable to pay attorneys to 
keep track of their statutory obligations.  Accordingly, the failure by these 
business owners to comply with often expensive and burdensome statutory 
obligations is not a good indication of an abuse of doctrine of limited 
liability.223 
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Matheson and Eby argue that “the failure of a company’s owners to observe 
corporate formalities has no relevance to an individual creditor’s claim 
against the owners, unless the non-observance of formalities is causally 
related to the creditor’s harm.”224  
 
The above arguments make it clear that piercing the veil based purely on the 
failure by an owner to follow certain statutory formalities, is fatally flawed. 
 
5.9.6 The single economic unit 
 
Each company within a group of companies constitutes a separate legal 
entity.  Each entity possesses separate rights and obligations.  In certain 
circumstances, the court will ignore the distinction between the various 
companies in a single group and treat it as though it is a single economic 
unit. 225  This results in the companies, although they are all independent, 
being regarded as part of the constituent group of companies, effectively 
piercing the corporate veil. Here, the critical question is one of control.  This 
is a question of fact.  Blackman notes that courts most commonly pierce the 
corporate veil where the holding company has such control over the 
subsidiary that the subsidiary is in fact carrying on the business of the parent 
company, resulting in the subsidiary being a façade.226  
 
Where there is little or no control, this will assist the courts in finding that 
agency is not present.  However, the existence of overriding share control in 
the subsidiary, is per se not sufficient to justify an agency relationship.227  
This is therefore a question mostly of fact and partially of equity, but there is 
no presumption that the subsidiary is the “alter ego” of the parent 
company.228 
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In Smith Stone and Knight v Birmingham Corporation229 six questions were 
noted as being relevant in ascertaining whether the subsidiary was carrying 
on the business of the holding company: 1) Were the profits of the subsidiary 
treated as though they belonged to the parent company? 2) Was 
management appointed by the parent company? 3) Was the parent 
company the head and brain of the trading venture? 4) Did the parent 
company govern the new ventures of the subsidiary and decide what should 
be done and how the capital should be structured and expanded 5) Did the 
parent company’s skill and direction make the profits for the subsidiary? and 
6) Was the parent company in constant control of the subsidiary?230  
 
Cilliers and Benade state that the factors to be considered are:  1) Was there 
a degree of control by the holding company over the subsidiary? 2) Is there 
an utter identity and community interest between the holding company and 
the subsidiary? and 3) If the subsidiary and the holding company are treated 
in isolation, would it lead to an unjustifiable inequity? 
 
Hawke notes that, with group relationships, the courts are willing to pierce 
the corporate veil where there is an avoidance or manipulation of liabilities or 
where it is seen to be necessary to rationalise or adjust rights or 
obligations.231  Where a subsidiary is used as a device in order, for example, 
to avoid the directors having to abide by their fiduciary duties in the holding 
company, the courts refuse to take into account the separate existence of 
the subsidiary and the holding company.232 
 
5.9.7 “Alter ego”  
 
The “Alter ego” category has similar characteristics to the “single economic 
entity” category.  The “Alter ego” category is where the company does not 
carry on its own business or affairs, but rather acts in the furtherance of the 
affairs of the controlling members, resulting in the situation where the 
controlling members do not treat the company as a separate entity.233  
Accordingly, the company is merely a conduit for the controlling members to 
carry on their own personal business, resulting in an abuse of the 
                                               
229
 Smith Stone and Knight v Birmingham Corporation [1939] 4 ALL ER 116. 
230
 Supra 231 at 121. 
231
 Supra 6 at 146. 
232
 Supra 165 at 14. 
233
 Supra 86 at para 46. 
 Page 44  
 
 
separateness of the company.234  Courts have, in these cases, pierced the 
corporate veil235. 
 
5.10 Problems with the categorisation approach 
 
The categorisation approach has resulted in the courts sending conflicting 
messages.  Not only are there inconsistencies in the manner in which the courts 
apply these various categories, but the factors taken into account can be argued, 
with a degree of certainty, to have inherent flaws.  Yet, with all this in mind, there 
seems to be very little development by the courts in this area and there is little 
indication that the courts intend to grapple with these difficult concepts in an attempt 
to unify the considerations in a uniformly applicable manner.  
 
Domanski236 supports the view that there are flaws in the categorisation approach 
as a means of deciding whether the veil should or should not be pierced237.  A 
situation could arise, says Domaski, where considerations such as fairness, public 
policy or equity would call for the courts to pierce the corporate veil, but the courts 
would be unable to categorise the particular issue into one of the defined 
categories, resulting in the courts being unable to pierce the corporate veil and a 
massive injustice to the parties.  This sort of situation indicates that the 
categorisation approach does not assist with the problems already surrounding veil 
piercing. 
 
Other commentators argue that the decision to pierce the corporate veil is not based 
on a single factor, but that various elements are required to be considered.  The 
courts should consider elements such as injustice or fundamental unfairness.238  
According to L Gallagher and P Ziegler, the discrepancy between the various cases 
is not problematic, but rather indicates that the courts want to make decisions based 
on evidence of an injustice being caused to the parties.239  It might be, for this very 
reason, that there has been a reluctance to create a rigid category of circumstances 
as to when the veil will and will not be pierced.240  The argument, in this regard, is 
that a flexible approach is required, to ensure that the veil is pierced in the 
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appropriate circumstances, having regard to the separate and distinguishable facts 
of each case.  
 
Carteaux notes that using a flexible, balancing approach would render decisions in 
the area of piercing the corporate veil vulnerable to subjective determinations of the 
equities involved and of the ways in which competing problems should be weighed.  
Carteaux argues that the maintenance of the traditional categories, such as fraud 
and agency, may reduce the risk of subjective and arbitrary decisions.  The 
categorisation approach is only to be used as evidence supporting policies, rather 
than to justify piercing.241  By maintaining the categories, one introduces an 
objective element to the balancing test.242 
 
5.10.1 Commentators tests 
 
Various commentators have proposed their views as to the appropriate test 
to be adopted. 
 
5.10.1.1 Blackman 
 
Blackman243 requires that there be special circumstances in 
existence prior to the court piercing the corporate veil.  These 
circumstances must indicate that the company is a mere façade 
concealing the true facts.  Accordingly, this will result in the 
separate existence of the company being abused or, at the very 
least, not being maintained in the full sense.  Thus, the veil will 
be pierced in the case of fraud.244  Instances where the company 
was set up as a mere façade concealing the true facts would be, 
for example, where the company has been incorporated to avoid 
certain statutory requirements.245  Larkin comments in this regard 
that “the theory underlying this approach would have to be that 
only a ‘real’ company, a company in substance and not just in 
form can claim separate entity status.”246  
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The theory of this test is hard to fault, but its application can be 
difficult in practice because there is no certainty or guiding 
principle to follow which shows how to recognise a “sham” 
company (where the members are hiding behind the separate 
persuading of the company).247  
 
5.10.1.2 Benade 
 
Some commentators are in favour of the development of the veil 
piercing doctrine and are of the view that our law, as it stands in 
respect of veil piercing, is too conservative. Benade is of the 
view that the veil can be pierced on the basis of equity alone.248  
 
Benade argues that the separation between companies and their 
members is only relevant for some of the consequences of 
incorporation, as sometimes the company is viewed as a single 
unit and other times it is seen as comprising of individual 
members. Benade is of the view that there would be no violation 
of company law if the separation between the members and the 
company was left out for the purpose of equity.249 
 
The second strand of Benade’s argument is that the concept of 
the separate entity is not an absolute one, but was designed for 
a purpose.  Thus, if this entity concept circumvents the law, it 
would go against what it intended to achieve.  Based on this 
argument, there should be no objection as to why a company 
should not be seen as a collection of individuals, as opposed to a 
separate entity, when it is required for the purposes of equity.250 
 
5.10.1.3 Domanski 
 
Domanski has argued for an approach in terms of which “the 
policies behind the recognition of a separate corporate existence 
must be balanced against the policies justifying piercing.”251  
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Domanski argues that the separate personality of the company 
lies at the cornerstone of our law. Accordingly, Domanski’s test 
advocates a cautious approach, with the protection of the 
separate personality being the foremost consideration.252  
Domanski, however, argues that the test of gross abuse of the 
separate personality is too restrictive and that simple abuse 
should suffice for piercing the corporate veil.253  
 
5.11 Tests in Other Jurisdictions 
 
It is useful to examine the case law applicable in foreign jurisdictions, as these 
decisions may provide insight into the issue of piercing the corporate veil and the 
flaws identified above. 
 
In the English Hammersmith254 case, the Court held that common sense 
must prevail.255  The court stated that the veil may be pierced on common 
sense, irrespective of the legal soundness of the reasoning.256  This decision 
indicates a holistic and substantive approach to the issue, with equity, 
through common sense, prevailing. 
 
The courts in England have also pierced the corporate veil in order to 
enforce commercial realities or expectations.257  This indicates that the 
English courts are willing to re-write commercial bargaining in certain 
cases.258  
 
 In Catamaran Cruisers Ltd v Williams and Others259 the court came very 
close to the limit beyond which it may be seen to be re-writing commercial 
bargaining.  This case involved an “employee” who had offered services to 
an employer through a company.  The court held that the claimant was still 
an employee.  he court held “there is no rule of law that the importation of a 
limited company into a relationship such as existed in this case prevents the 
continuation of a contract of employment.  If the true relationships is that of 
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employer and employee, it cannot be changed by putting a different label 
upon it.”260 
 
An important decision is the Louisiana Supreme Court decision, Glazer v 
Commission on Ethics for Public Employees261.  In this case, the court held 
that the veil may be pierced by a balancing of “the policies behind recognition 
of a separate corporate existence” with the “policies justifying the piercing.”262  
Thus, there is a balancing of the competing policy considerations to 
determine whether the veil of incorporation should be pierced or not.  This 
decision was a radical change from the past decisions of that court.263  
Dennis J stated that the balancing approach would result in the separate 
personally of the company being maintained in some instances, whilst in 
other situations it would be discarded.264  The court distinguished the 
situation at hand from the situation where a company waives its right to 
separate legal personality.  The court held that if there is a waiver of this 
right, then the veil should be pierced.  The court noted that there is strong 
policy in favour of limited liability.  Thus limited liability will be protected 
unless there is evidence of waiver.  Evidence would be the company’s own 
disregard of the corporate form or by the company using the corporate form 
to commit a fraud.265 
 
In the case United States v Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit266, the court held 
that the separate personality of a company would be disregarded where “the 
notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, 
protect fraud or defend crime.”  It is thus clear from the Milwaukee 
Refrigerator Transit case that American Courts have also made use of a 
categorisation approach when deciding whether or not the limited liability of 
the company will be disregarded.267 
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5.11.1 Alternative Tests  
 
In order to determine when the corporate veil should be pierced, the three-
pronged instrumentality doctrine and undue domination tests have been 
suggested. 
 
5.11.1.1 Three-pronged instrumentality doctrine 
 
The three-pronged instrumentality doctrine is a test wherein the 
plaintiff is required to show various factors before the courts will 
reject the separate legal personality of the company.  Firstly, it 
must be shown that the defendant had control of the company, 
which control was so complete that it resulted in total domination 
of policy, finance and business practices such that the company 
had no mind of its own.  Secondly, it must be shown that this 
control was used to commit a fraud or a wrong which violated the 
plaintiff’s rights, and thirdly that the control and breach of the 
duty that was owed to the plaintiff was a cause of the plaintiff’s 
injury.268  This test indicates that control on its own will not 
suffice.269 
 
5.11.1.2 Undue Domination 
 
A test which has been used by the Virginia courts, requires the 
court to look firstly at whether there is “undue domination and 
control of the company by the defendant” and secondly, whether 
“the corporation was a devise or “sham” used to disguise 
wrongs, perpetuate fraud, or conceal crime.”270  This test 
requires intentional misconduct by the defendant member.  
 
It is noteworthy that none of these tests create clear-cut 
standards.  All that remains is a list of factors which one must 
measure against the facts of the case at hand.271  From the 
above discussion, it is evident that South Africa is not alone.  
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Foreign jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America have the same inherent problems with the 
intricacies of the doctrine.  Since these problems are not unique 
to South Africa, it is apparent that the difficulties cannot be 
blamed on the South African judiciary, but rather are inherent to 
the doctrine itself. 
 
 
6. The pros and cons of veil piercing as a doctrine. 
 
The veil piercing doctrine allows the courts to thrust upon the members of companies 
unlimited liability.  It is questionable as to whether veil piercing is equitable, having regard 
to the fact that the legal doctrine is uncertain in the case law.272  
 
The doctrine is required to identify risks that have been externalised, but also has the task 
of differentiating those risks which a member should not be entitled to externalise.  Thus, 
the law is required to take into account various considerations such as compensation of 
victims of corporate wrong doings, capital formation, economic growth and can even go as 
far as including economic democracy.273  This is no easy task and it may be argued that the 
veil piercing doctrine currently fails to meet these requirements.  
 
The standard argument in favour of veil piercing is that it serves as a safety valve, as it 
allows for the courts to deal with cases where limited liability and the externalities 
associated with it are excessive.274 
 
It is commonly accepted that limited liability can create negative externalities.  Limited 
liability allows for companies to externalise part of their risk and costs that are incurred in 
the course of business, which are passed onto the constituencies and, one could go as far 
as to say, onto society at large.275  It is therefore evident that there is a need to protect 
those who deal with the company276  Thus, the veil can be pierced when the policies behind 
the presumption of corporate independence and limited liability are outweighed by policy 
justifications for disregarding the corporate form. .277 
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If one were to maintain the distinction of the separate personality of the company at all 
times, certain unjust circumstances could arise from this immunity.  This shelter from 
liability would protect those who failed to operate the company as a separate entity.  Thus, 
for those who do not respect the formalities of the law and ignore the applicable restrictions, 
it is useful (and indeed beneficial) for the courts to be able to pierce the corporate veil and 
impute liability where it belongs.278 
 
It is evident that veil piercing may be of use, and that the reason for its existence can be 
argued to be a rational one, being to protect innocent parties (particularly in instances of 
fraudulent conduct by the company’s members).  This is not to say that the doctrine is not 
without fault. It has been argued by Bainbridge as well as other commentators, that the 
doctrine has some flaws which go to the very core of the doctrine.  Some academics are of 
the view that the doctrine needs to be reformed, whilst others take a much more extreme 
view and advocate for the abolishment of the doctrine. 
 
Although the courts have increasingly tried to define the approaches as to when the veil 
can be pierced279, the potential personal liability that may arise can be argued to be open 
ended.  Hawke notes that the courts’ intervention is impossible to rationalise given that the 
intervention is not backed by any coherent principle.  According to Hawke, the lack of a 
coherent principle can be explained if one can appreciate that the removal of the corporate 
veil “could produce an order of the court requiring a regulatory disclosure at one end of the 
scale and an award of substantial damages in [delict] at the other.”  
 
Veil piercing can give rise to various legal consequences.  Accordingly, facts that will justify 
piercing the corporate veil will depend upon the consequence sought.  Where what is 
sought is the drastic remedy of holding the members liable for the debts of the company or 
the imposition on the company of an obligation incurred by its members, then the facts that 
are considered by the courts will not necessarily be the same as those that will justify the 
veil to be pierced where other consequences are sought.280  It would seem that the courts 
would in each case take different facts into account.  Different judges might find different 
facts to be relevant, which may have an effect on the outcome of the decision.   
 
One of the intrinsic flaws to the veil piercing doctrine is that there is no clear standard as to 
when the courts will pierce the corporate veil.  It is noteworthy, in this regard, that the veil 
piercing doctrine is highly fact specific.  The successes of some cases over others vary only 
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in degree and not in kind.281  Thus, this area of law can be regarded as being unpredictable, 
random and ambiguous.282 
 
This is evident in Gilford Motors283 and Die Dros284 cases.  In the Die Dros case, the court 
would not uphold the restraint of trade based on a lack of evidence, whilst the court in 
Gilford Motors did.  
 
Another area in which the inconsistencies are evident is in the foreign position in the area of 
leasehold arrangements.  The courts have said, in some instances, that they have sufficient 
power to pierce the veil in order to identify the continued identity of the occupant.285  Other 
authorities have, however, indicated that the courts are unwilling to provide that the 
corporate vehicles are shams and that the use of companies in leasehold arrangements 
indicate the true commercial intention of the parties.286 
 
The very purpose of corporate law is to establish certainty and predictability.  The 
Companies Act is very clear in this regard and indicates exactly which requirements are to 
be complied with for a company to be incorporated.  These procedures are, however, time 
consuming and costly.  As such, it is necessary to ask why members would follow the strict 
requirements in the Companies Act if they still run the risk of losing their limited liability 
status.  This lack of certainty imposes a substantial cost.287 
 
Veil piercing has real costs. Investors at incorporation are denied certainty and 
predictability.  Some investors will over invest in expensive precautions, whilst others will 
under-invest in insurance and risk reduction.  As regards investors after incorporation, the 
vague veil piercing standards lead to expensive litigation and not infrequently erroneous 
results.288  However, the social cost of legal rules is not only the costs they impose on the 
parties themselves, but also on the costs which the legal system will incur in enforcing the 
rules.289 
 
Accordingly, the lack of predictability in court decisions is amongst the greatest deterrent to 
litigation being pursued.  Injured persons will not litigate pressing issues, as they are unable 
to confidently predict the cost or the outcome.  This is due to the expensive litigation fees 
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and the possibly erroneous results.  As such, parties may be deterred from engaging in 
socially desirable activities or, at the least, will take excessive precautions.290  According to 
Bainbridge, veil piercing achieves, ”neither fairness nor efficiency, but rather only 
uncertainty and lack of predictability, increasing transaction costs for small businesses.”291 
 
Due to the doctrine’s vague standards, judges have little guidance in terms of precedent 
and a wide discretion in deciding whether or not to pierce the veil.  As a result, judges 
concern themselves with the specific facts at hand and are thus more concerned with the 
equities in question as opposed to the implications it would have on members’ liability and 
society at large.292  
 
Determining whether limited liability should be available to a company depends on a case-
by-case analysis.  This results in the courts having to balance competing policy decisions.  
The courts must encourage businesses to internalise the costs to society of their activities, 
whilst at the same time the courts wish to avoid impeding capital formation and economic 
growth. Balancing these concerns requires economic analysis.  The problem here is that 
the courts have no staff economists to assist them with this analysis, resulting in additional 
expense to litigants seeking to pierce the corporate veil (who are thus required to hire their 
own economic experts).293 
 
When judges are left to decide on their own, it is unlikely that they will be capable of striking 
the correct balance.  This is not a personal attack on judges but rather the circumstance 
under which judges are expected to work.  Thus the problem lies with the judicial system 
and not judges per se. Like anyone else, judges make mistakes.  Further, judges work 
under massive time constraints.  Due to these constraints, judges have an incentive to 
minimise effort. Judges are also not experts in every area of the law and are not all 
interested in developing their expertise in specific areas of law.294  Judges therefore might 
decide these cases with minimum effort.295  Whilst true in the majority of jurisdictions 
around the world, the above issues are particularly relevant in the South African context 
due largely to our under resourced judicial system.  
 
A further problem is that most of the factors considered by the courts are unrelated to the 
policy concerns which are present in limited liability.296  The courts fail to give any general 
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guidance as to how the factors should be weighted or balanced.297  According to 
Thompson's298 findings, the most commonly cited reasons for the courts piercing the 
corporate veil were mere conclusory statements such as “control”, “alter ego” and “sham” 
companies.299  Those who are in favour of tidy doctrines with easy application will not be in 
favour of veil piercing being part of our law, as judicial opinions in this area are vague. 
These decisions give us very little assistance in understanding the doctrine or when it will 
be invoked.  Some argue that veil piercing offers judges short cuts and allows for judge to 
dispose of the case summarily without dealing with all of the complexities relating to the 
case law at hand or the doctrine.”300 
 
Due to the current state of the manner in which veil piercing is dealt with, judges are able to 
impose their own ideas of justice without needing to be to concerned with precedent or 
appeals against or reviews of their decisions.  When judges rely on short cuts, the result is 
often skewed and results in a mediocre doctrine.  The courts seem to rely on various 
factors to make a decision even though it is seldom that they understand why the factors 
are of importance.301  Courts seem to have a vague, intuitive sense of what amounts to a 
fair outcome, but which they cannot easily articulate.  As a result, courts fall back on vague 
labels such as ‘alter ego’, ‘lack of separation’ which results in the conclusory 
announcements referred to above302.  Thus, instead of reasoned analysis, courts rely on 
vague labels.  
 
Larkin and Cassim are of the view that the courts, “are… feeling their way in the dark.”303 
This, they say, is because the courts are relying on instinct rather than on principle. 
Although judicial instinct is often correct, judicial instinct alone this is not enough. In both 
Cape Pacific and Hulse-Reutter, one can argue on principle that the correct decision was 
indeed reached, but both decisions would have been better approached along the lines of 
principle.304 
 
The questions that judges ask when piercing the corporate veil are not always the correct 
ones.  This can results in the decision-maker looking at the side issues.305  Even if veil 
piercing is abolished, the judiciary will not be able to avoid these tough and difficult issues.  
The judiciary would have to refocus its judicial analysis on the relevant questions. 
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According to Bainbridge, these questions should be “did the defendant-member do 
anything for which he should be held directly liable?  Did the member commit fraud, which 
lead a creditor to forgo contractual protection?  Did the member use fraudulent transfers or 
insider preferences to siphon funds out of their corporation?”306  These questions are more 
likely to lead to an optimal outcome. 
 
Veil piercing has been argued to function as a tax on entrepreneurs or as a trap for the 
unwary.  Members who can afford competent attorneys will spend time, effort and 
resources to ensure that their business operations are conducted in a way that will limit 
their veil piercing exposure.307  These are the people to whom veil piercing will be a tax (for 
the benefit of such legal advice).  Those with insufficient funds for adequate legal advices 
will be trapped by veil piercing, without there being any regard by the courts to whether 
their conduct is really culpable or socially undesirable.308 
 
Some argue that the objectives of the veil piercing doctrine are unobtainable, as it is called 
upon to attain lofty goals, such as leading members to internalise risk while simultaneously 
not deterring capital formation and economic growth, all the while still promoting the 
populist notions of economic democracy.309  However, there seems to be no evidence to 
indicate that veil piercing will cause claimants to internalise risk.310  It can be further argued 
that the doctrine of veil piercing focuses on irrelevancies and not on whether claimants 
used their control to externalise risk.  What is clear, however, is that courts will not pierce 
the veil whenever the defendant has externalised some cost onto third parties.311 
 
It is argued that veil piercing does not address the problems of negative externalities.  This 
is evident from the fact that our law of veil piercing is very vague312 and the application of 
the doctrine is unpredictable.  Bainbridge argues that equity investors can protect 
themselves against personal liability in the case of veil piercing by using modest levels of 
capital or insurance.  The problem here is that, with such a dysfunctional doctrine, the 
likelihood of it creating incentives for companies to optimally internalise the social costs of 
their business activities is not very high313. 
 
A means of protection for the voluntary creditor is for them to request that the members of 
the company sign personal surety for the debts of the company.  If the creditor does not do 
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this, there should be no reason as to why the creditor should get a second chance by 
requesting that the courts pierce the veil so as to enable the creditor to reach the personal 
assets of the members.  Thus, there are no externalities with respect to parties who 
voluntarily contract with a company.  This should, of course, be limited to instances of 
misrepresentation.314  
 
 
7. Alternative suggestions to veil piercing 
 
7.1 Abolishing the doctrine 
 
It is also necessary to consider the implications of the abolishment of the veil 
piercing doctrine on the negative externalities created by limited liability, in the event 
that limited liability is retained. 
 
It is argued that companies would have a license to externalise risk.  This is, 
however, regarded as a highly unlikely outcome, as market forces would constrain 
the ability of companies to do so. 
 
A second argument is that companies can externalise their business risks through 
personal misconduct.  However, this remains sanctioned under a number of legal 
regimes.315  In many of the veil piercing cases, the plaintiff could have brought a 
direct action against the member, as the defendant had acted in a manner that 
misled the creditor.  In other cases, the defendant could be a joint party.  With the 
corporate defendant, one could even impose vicarious liability.316  Bainbridge is of 
the view that, “because the examples capture the cases in which limited liability 
seems most problematic (namely misrepresentation in connection with contract 
claims and deliberate externalisation of unreasonable risks in delictual cases), 
abolishing veil piercing would not leave deserving creditors without a remedy.” 317 
 
The veil piercing doctrine, according to Bainbridge, could be refocused in order to 
eliminate irrelevancies and could be tied more closely to the policy purposes it is 
intended to effectuate318  However, he is of the view that veil piercing should not be 
reformed but rather abolished.  He argues that it is unlikely that reform can be 
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expected to produce any significant improvements to the situation at hand.319  The 
abolishment of the doctrine would force courts to redirect judicial incentives towards 
the correct solutions to the problems.320 
 
Bainbridge says that there are two major problems with veil piercing.  Firstly, it 
allows for occasional judicial error.  Courts may reach incorrect outcomes as a 
result of the doctrine being flawed.  If veil piercing were abolished, it would force 
courts to use other doctrines and principles of law that go more directly to the issue 
at hand.321  Secondly, even if all the decisions involving veil piercing have the 
correct outcome, there is still a cost.  This is due to the marginal effect of the 
doctrine on the small business owners.322  In this regard, the veil piercing doctrine 
forces entrepreneurs to focus on spending time and effort on organisational 
formalities.  This does not address the real problem of negative externalities.323 
  
The organisational formality aspect of veil piercing can encourage small companies 
to hire information processors, as well as reputational intermediaries, like lawyers 
and accountants.  This could assist in improving the quality of disclosure of such 
small companies.  Notwithstanding this, it is difficult to see how this would assist 
involuntary creditors as, for example, there is no comfort for a delict creditor or 
victim in knowing that the company’s books and records are in good order.324 
 
Voluntary creditors can demand certain organisational formalities and can bargain 
for the compliance.325  The problem with this argument is that it is difficult to find the 
evidence that the creditor wanted compliance with the organisational formalities with 
which veil piercing is concerned.  Secondly, even if compliance were the 
majoritarian default, the fact that veil piercing is so rare and unpredictable makes it 
an odd choice for a means to achieve such compliance.326 
 
There is thus no disputing that the veil piercing doctrine is inefficient and does not 
adequately meet its expectations.  Yet the doctrine remains part of our company 
law, in light of the fact that the doctrine of separate legal personality (to which the 
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veil piercing doctrine is inextricably tied) is indispensable in a corporate law regime.  
The question is whether veil piercing is the best solution to solving the problem of 
fraudulent businessmen.  This does not seem to be the case, as there appear to be 
some viable solutions, each of which has less of a negative impact than the 
imprecise doctrine of veil piercing.  
 
7.2 Alternative suggestions to the veil piercing doctrine 
 
In order to obtain historic perspective, it is necessary to bear in mind that the courts 
began to accept the veil piercing doctrine for the first time in only the 1980’s.  Prior 
to this, there were a host of cases which quietly managed to deal both realistically 
and satisfactorily with the often very difficult problems of the separate entity 
principle, without having to employ the principle of veil piercing.  The cases that did 
make reference to the doctrine were generally rather vague.327  This is a clear 
indication that there are alternative exceptions to the separate personality rule, 
other than the veil piercing doctrine.  It has been argued that the veil piercing 
doctrine is in fact a false trail for our law to follow and that there is no reason as to 
why the courts cannot deal with the difficulties of limited liability without having to 
make use of the doctrine of veil piercing.328 
 
7.3 Alternative Reasoning with the Same Outcome 
 
It is submitted that the vast majority of the cases dealing with the doctrine of veil 
piercing could have had the same outcome, but with different, more justifiable, 
reasoning (as an alternative to applying the difficult doctrine of veil piercing).  
 
In Cape Pacific, the court looked at control and stated329 at all material times [the 
controller] personally exercised control over the shares as effectively and 
completely as if they belonged to him personally. In relation to its dealings with the 
shares, the seller was more than just [the controller’s] puppet; it was effectively 
none other than [the controller] personally, albeit in a different guise.”330  Larkin and 
Cassim argue that the courts seem to be saying that the company was merely the 
agent of the controller.  If this is in fact the case, there would be no problem in the 
company calling the controller (the member) to assist in performing the court 
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order.331  An argument in the alternative would be that the company has the right to 
call upon the controller as well as a third party to assist with it performing the court 
order owing to the fact that there had been bad faith.332  Accordingly, on either 
approach, the controller could have been called upon to meet the claim against the 
company.333 
 
In Tor Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gee - Six Superweld CC334, the central issue revolved 
around a one line contract where a foreign company had agreed, in favour of a 
South African company, that it would not sell its products to anyone in South Africa 
other than the South African company.  The question at hand was whether the 
subsidiary of the foreign company was also bound by the contract.  The court stated 
that, if it could be shown that the foreign company was misusing its subsidiary to 
perpetuate a fraud, or that the subsidiary was being used for a dishonest or 
improper purpose to subvert the South African company’s rights, the court would 
pierce the veil and disregard the separate juristic personality of the subsidiary 
company from that of the holding company in order to uphold the South African 
company’s rights.335  However, the court held that no such case could be made out 
on the facts in question.336  In this case, the court seems to have reached the 
correct decision.  However, the decision could certainly have been arrived at in a 
different manner.  The contract could have been interpreted more searchingly, or 
the court could have added a tacit term to it.  This would have allowed the court to 
determine whether the actions by the subsidiary were really beyond the reach of the 
contract.337  On this basis, it would be surprising if it was (and, even of this basis, 
the court appears to have reached the correct decision).  It would be equally 
surprising if, when one was looking at the actions of the subsidiary and comparing 
the actions that were and were not beyond the ambit of the contract, the business 
relationship between the holding company and the subsidiary was not decisive in 
the court’s determination338  The court in Tor saw this very clearly.  
 
If one applies general contractual principles and finds that the actions of the 
subsidiary were in fact not covered by the contract, then it would be very hard to see 
how the holding company committed a fraud by using its subsidiary to subvert the 
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rights of the South African company.339  However, the decision of the court in the 
Hulse-Reutter case appears to require that there be no remedy in contract before a 
court can pierce the corporate veil.340 
 
Airlink Pilots Association SA v SA Airlines341 was decided before the Hulse-Reutter 
decision was handed down.  Here the court regarded the question of who was the 
real decision-maker342 as being more important than the question of who was the 
real employer.343  The court held that the decisions emanated from the holding 
company.  This was “a device to change the terms and the conditions of the 
employment relationship between [the holding company and the pilots].”344  The 
court held accordingly that the commercial relationship between the two companies 
should be disregarded and the corporate veil pierced.345  The question that needs to 
be addressed is whether it was indeed necessary to pierce the veil in this case.  An 
alternative approach has been suggested, namely that the court should have 
examined whether the subsidiary was merely the agent of the holding company.346  
If this had been the approach, the important question would have been not who was 
making the decision, but rather for whom the decision was being made.  The 
question in this analysis is whether the holding company was in fact acting on its 
own behalf, with the subsidiary acting as its agent, or if the holding company was 
acting on behalf of the subsidiary, with the subsidiary as principal.  This approach is 
very similar to the approach taken by the court.  However, since the court based its 
decision on the doctrine of veil piercing, the decision lacked analytical clarity.347 
 
The facts indicate that the courts were concerned with the holding company acting 
as the agent of the subsidiary.  It is thus submitted that the answer ought in fact to 
have been found in contractual principles, rather than the doctrine of veil piercing 
(would was unnecessary and gave rise to difficulties in application).348 
 
In Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Professional Contract 
Administration349, the court equated the doctrine of veil piercing to the doctrine of 
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substance over form.350  Accordingly, it is arguable that one is required merely to 
look at the substance of a relationship between a company and its members rather 
than its mere form.  It is argued by Larkin and Cassim that, if the test is substance 
over form, there is no need to automatically pierce the veil.351  
 
These few examples are clearly illustrative that, in the vast majority of cases, veil 
piercing is not the only option open to the court and is not the only way in which a 
plaintiff can receive relief.  Thus, if the courts expand their thinking to alternative 
applications of general commercial legal principles, there may be no need to rely 
strictly on piercing the corporate veil (which, as stated above, is difficult to apply). 
 
7.4 The separate entity theory 
 
Other theories have emerged as to the manner in which abuse of the corporate 
form should be managed without the corporate veil having to be pierced.  Larkin 
states that it is no surprise that veil-piercing cases are so hard to find, as veil 
piercing does not really exist.  According to Larkin, the separate entity theory is a 
solution which is capable of dealing with the entity in all of its facets, and which 
escapes the problems of vagueness which are prominent in the veil piercing 
doctrine.352 
 
Larkin argues that one cannot sacrifice the entity construction.  To do so, he says, 
will be to re-write the law.  He goes even further and states that to sacrifice the 
entity in favour of equity will frustrate the law and goes against everything that it is 
trying to achieve.  There is nothing in the law which gives effect to the reversing of 
the entity status, nor anything that would be sufficiently compelling for one to argue 
for the law to be interpreted in such a manner.353  
 
Larkin argues that an approach is needed which will result in being able to reach 
those individual members of the company that need to be reached.354  This 
approach requires sensitivity, so that one can link the reason for looking from the 
company to the members which, he says, is not achieved by the veil piercing 
doctrine. 
 
                                               
350
 Supra 351 at 190 B-C. 
351
 Larkin and Cassim, Company Law, The Annual Survey of South African Law 2002, Juta 635 at 635. 
352
 Supra 5 at 297. 
353
 Supra 5 at 282. 
354
 Supra 5 at 283. 
 Page 62  
 
 
Larkin further argues that the entity must remain unharmed.  The company is an 
entity that is to remain separate from the members.  In terms of a strict entity 
theory, the entity (as a separate person) may be of absolutely no significance.  The 
relevance will depend upon the legal issue which is under consideration.  These 
legal issues can be contractual, statutory in nature or based on common law.  The 
legal issue must always be approached properly.  Larkin states that “[o]nly if it is, 
and properly understood, is it then applied in the company situation, and the proper 
answer on whether to focus on the company emerge.”355  The problem that arises 
is that people disagree as to what the correct approaches to these legal issues are.  
This problem transcends the problem of the corporate veil.  
 
Larkin says that what has been mistaken as piercing the corporate veil should 
rather be seen as the battle between substance and form.356  Difficulties can arise 
and are due to the fact that the company is sui generis, whilst the principles in 
statute, contract and common law are formed around traditional categories.  
Carefully drafted contracts and legislation could cater for it, but the problem lies in 
the common law.  He says that “the concrete forms are unlikely to be made 
adequate in the foreseeable future.  In the interim, substance will enjoy form’s 
discomfort and, when this discomfort becomes intolerable, will enjoy many a 
victory, at the expense of form.”357 
 
Although unacceptable results may arise, Larkin notes that there are ways to avoid 
these.  Firstly, the legal rule being applied must be properly understood.  Secondly, 
the separate entity cannot be applied like a blunt instrument which causes results 
which no one can defend.  He notes that, instead, what needs to be remembered is 
that the company exists to facilitate and encourage business enterprises. 
 
Perhaps the courts ought to approach corporate form abuses in this manner as this 
would avoid the courts having to look for a category into which all of the facts will fit, 
or having to balance various policy considerations.  The principle will, it is 
submitted, result in greater judicial accuracy as well as more predictable results. 
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7.5 Piercing the veil when there are other remedies readily available  
 
In Cape Pacific, Smalberg JA stated that358 “I see no reason why piercing of the 
corporate veil should necessarily be precluded if another remedy exists.  As a 
general rule, if a person has more than one legal remedy at his disposal, he can 
select one rather than another… the existence of another remedy or the failure to 
pursue one that was available, may be a relevant factor when policy considerations 
come into play, but it cannot be of overriding importance.”359 
 
Blackman360 is, however, of the view that the courts can only pierce the veil when 
there are no other remedies available to the plaintiff.  He suggests that the 
departure in the Salomon case should be permitted to a plaintiff only when the 
plaintiff has no alternative remedies and, accordingly, will suffer a major injustice if 
the veil is not pierced.361 
 
Piercing the veil should never be used simply as an alternative remedy, where on 
exactly the same facts, another remedy is available that would have the same 
consequence for the plaintiff.  This is because all alternative remedies assume what 
an order obtained through veil piercing does not, namely the existence of the 
company as a separate entity.  If an alternative remedy were available and the 
courts could avoid piercing the veil, then the plaintiff would not suffer a prejudice if 
the veil were not pierced.  Accordingly, veil piercing would not be justified and the 
separate existence of the companies would not be undermined.362 
 
Based on the dictum in Cape Pacific363 it was argued in Hulse-Reutter that the 
existence of other remedies against the company does not preclude a remedy 
against the members for any fraud committed by them.364  
 
The court’s response in Hulse-Reutter to Cape Pacific was, firstly, that the court in 
Cape Pacific did not state that the existence of another remedy was irrelevant and, 
secondly, that one must look at the dictum in its context.  In this regard, the court 
stated that the facts were in this case very different to those in Cape Pacific.365  In 
Hulse-Reutter, the respondent’s contractual rights were enforceable in the first 
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instance against the company.  The court said that the very exceptional nature of 
the relief which the respondent sought against the member requires that there be no 
other remedies available.  The fact that the company would be unable to pay the 
debt if it was sued is fatal to the respondent’s case.366  Thus, the court seemed to 
disagree with the decision in Cape Pacific by providing that if other remedies are 
available, then a plaintiff cannot make use of the veil piercing doctrine.  
 
It should be noted that the rights in Cape Pacific were also rights of first instance.  
As such, even though the remedy had prescribed, it would have made no 
difference.  Any claim can prescribe and there is no reason as to why the law of 
prescription should not apply to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, as it 
would be applied in any other area of law.367  As such, it does not seem possible to 
distinguish Cape Pacific in the way that the court did.368 Larkin and Cassim note that 
it is not surprising as to why the two cases differ on this issue.  The reason for this is 
that the cases also differ as to what requirements must be met for an “unfair 
advantage”.369 
 
The above inconsistency illustrates again how confused and unpredictable this area 
of law is, even with regard to the simple issue of being able to argue in favour of veil 
piercing in the alternative.  An interesting issue to consider is why a plaintiff would 
opt for a remedy of veil piercing when there is extensive case law, as well as 
academic literature, which indicates that the doctrine is confused and that the 
results of litigation are uncertain.  This is evident by the two cases mentioned 
above.  There is a high risk factor involved when a plaintiff decides to rely on veil 
piercing as their remedy.  Other areas of the law (such as misrepresentation in 
contract law) are much more clearly defined.  Accordingly, if the plaintiff has a 
strong case based on misrepresentation, it seems to be illogical as to why they 
would elect to rely on veil piercing as a remedy. 
 
Most academics agree that veil piercing is an exceptional remedy as it undermines 
the very essence of the separate personality rule.  Since the separate personality 
rule is important in any system of commercial law, common sense seems to indicate 
that, if there are other remedies available, the alternative remedies to veil piercing 
should be applied by the courts.   
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7.6 “Agency”  
 
“Agencies” can be described as where the company does not carry on its own 
business affairs or business interest, but rather acts in the furtherance of the affairs 
of the controlling members, resulting in the situation where the controlling members 
do not treat the company as a separate entity.370  Accordingly, the company is 
merely a conduit for the controlling members to carry on their own personal 
business, resulting in an abuse of the separateness of the company.371   
 
The company can act as the agent of its members if it is authorised to do so and, in 
such circumstances, the members will be bound by the acts of the company.  In 
these instances, it is the members and not the company that will be liable in respect 
of any contract entered into by the company on their behalf, as their agent.372  This 
flows from general agency principles, where the principle will be liable for the acts of 
the agent.  Where a person or a company contracts as an agent, it is not the agent 
that assumes liability, but the person on whose behalf the agent is acting (the 
agreement reached will be the agreement of the principal).  As such, the principal is 
the only person who can sue or be sued in terms of a contract of this nature.373  
 
The courts can impute the liability of the company onto the members and can 
circumvent the issues that have arisen in relation to veil piercing by treating the 
company as the agent of the member.  This results in the members being held liable 
for the acts of the agent (in this case, the company).374  The courts have, in certain 
cases, ignored the separate legal personality of the company based on the agency 
construction.375  Clearly, however, the agency principle cannot be applied in every 
case.  The limited circumstances in which it can be utilised are where the members 
disregard the separate nature of the company and in fact utilise it as their agent. 
 
Although there is case law that indicates that this is agency in the normal sense, 
Blackman is of the view that this is not the case.  In this regard, Blackman has 
stated that “[t]his is not merely because the courts do not insist upon the existence 
of a contract of agency…in terms of which the company does act as an agent 
properly so called. It is because the company in question does not in truth ever 
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conduct the business of an agent.”376  Accordingly, if the company did act as an 
agent, then it would be conducting its own business, that being the business of 
agents.377  
 
It is not disputed that a person who controls a company can abuse the corporate 
form and use the company as its agent.378  As early as the Salomon case, the court 
held that the veil can be pierced in instances of “agency”.  However, the courts are 
reluctant to determine that there was a relationship of agency and principle in 
existence and, in such a case, to pierce the veil.379  To escape the strict 
interpretation of the separate legal personality of the company, it is easier to rely on 
agency than to rely on the abuse of the corporate form, owing to the fact that the 
agency argument does not require any form of impropriety or fraudulent conduct 
(which must be present when piercing the corporate veil).380  Therefore, all of the 
advantages of separate legal personality are present, without actually treating 
company as a separate entity.381  The agency construction has thus been argued to 
be a helpful instrument in to adapting legal principles to modern requirements.382  
 
It was argued by Lord Denning that if control was present, it would be sufficient for 
the courts to pierce the veil on that basis.  However, in Re Teconion Investments 
Ltd383 it was stated that control, on its own, was insufficient to give rise to the 
piercing of the corporate veil.  Dillan CJ held that one must look at whether “in truth 
the company is the agent of the … man”.  It was also held that it is insufficient to 
consider if one man was the dominant figure.  It was noted, in this regard, that 
practical problems may arise in this test, owing to the different standards imposed 
on the various types of corporate entities (for example a close corporation with a few 
dominant members, which has no ‘corporate ends’ separate from those of the 
owners).  In recognition of this, the courts generally require plaintiffs to show 
something more than simple control over the corporate.384 
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In Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2)385, the court accepted the agency construction and, in 
holding the member liable, held that “[the member] controlled their every movement. 
He pulled the strings…They were his agents to do as he commanded. He was the 
principle behind them.” 
  
In British Thompson-Houston Co Ltd v Sterling Accessories Ltd386 the court held 
that, if there is an absence of proof, a company cannot be seen as the agent of 
those who are the sole directors and members, in order to impute personal liability 
upon them for delictual conduct.387  This decision was based on the Salomon case, 
in holding that agency of the company cannot be inferred from merely holding office 
as a director or by having control of the shares, but that one needs to establish 
agency substantively.388  It has been held that the establishment of agency could be 
done through an agency agreement and, it has been suggested, that if there is no 
express agreement, then agency will not be present.389  Hawke is of the view that 
this is too extreme. 
 
In practice, however, the courts are willing to infer the existence of an agency 
relationship where the facts indicate that a company was incorporated with minimal 
capital and there is no place of business nor staff.  In Re FG (Films) Ltd390 90 
percent of the company was American, but they wanted the film to be registered as 
British and not as American.  The registration was refused as it was clearly an 
American film based on an agency relationship.391 
 
In the United States of America, the courts have been unwilling to articulate with 
clarity the circumstances as to when piercing the corporate veil is permitted, but in 
the instance of agency the courts will not only consider the controlling interest but 
also whether a company is under-capitalised, the degree of financial ownership, the 
degree of actual dominance of the affairs in practice, the failure to observe corporate 
formalities and the siphoning of funds.392  
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7.7 Insurance 
 
If veil piercing is going to continue to be applied in the manner in which it has over 
the past two decades, then companies will have to take their own precautions to 
protect themselves.  No member wants to find himself/herself in the situation where 
his/her limited liability status could be forsaken, potentially placing him/her in a 
situation where he/she is required to pay a defendant a large sum of money out of 
his/her personal estate. In order to protect themselves against such a situation, 
companies (and members) can take out insurance policies. 
 
If insurance is available, it can result in limited liability losing much of its relevance, 
except where it is used to identify the person who is under pressure to secure the 
insurance.393  As a result, insurance has been seen as an alternative to limited 
liability.394  However, it is idealistic to expect that all companies will have total 
insurance coverage for all corporate risks in respect of which limited liability is 
externalised.395  Academics have stated that, if limited liability did not exist, 
companies would attempt to invent it through insurance (a close substitute).396 
Limited liability is a shortcut to this and avoids the cost of separate transactions. In 
this light, limited liability appears to be compelling.397  
 
It seems to be a common feature that when companies are being incorporated, 
liability insurance is taken. This indicates that there is  uncertainty surrounding 
limited liability as a protective device,398 where there exists a fear of insolvency 
(especially in respect of risky ventures).399 Most companies choose a relatively low 
coverage limit as opposed to an upper limit on coverage, which suggests that 
incomplete insurance is a common strategy.400 
 
One must note that creditors can also rely on personal guarantees in order to avoid 
having to rely on the application of limited liability in the event of business failure. 
Here, insurance may play a very important role in both the bargaining power 
between the company and the creditor, as well as part of the company’s own 
strategy for commercial purposes.401 Insurance will reduce, if not eliminate, the 
                                               
393
 Supra 6 at 121. 
394
 Supra 65 at 139.  This being where insurance is available on appropriate terms.  
395
 Supra 6 at 121. 
396
 Ibid at 121 and Supra 28 at 47-48. 
397
 Supra 28 at 47-48. 
398
 Supra 6 at 122. 
399
 Ibid at 122. 
400
 Ibid at 122. 
401
 Ibid at 122. 
 Page 69  
 
 
externalities which the company would otherwise be protected against through 
limited liability.402 One cannot forget that there is another factor involved, namely 
the willingness to accept the terms of the insurance policy in question. It is up to the 
company to decide on the economic and financial advantages of investing in 
insurance.403 
 
As mentioned before, veil piercing is unpredictable and not very often the subject of 
litigation.  Thus, companies will need to balance on the one hand the risk of the 
company being incapable of satisfying a debt404, which could result in the members 
being liable in their personal capacity as well as the likelihood of the courts actually 
piercing the veil with, on the other hand, the willingness of the company to pay 
monthly premiums to an insurance company on the mere possibility that the veil 
might be pierced. This, as mentioned above, does not seem to be much of an 
incentive and the latter seems to outweigh the former. 
 
Insurance of this kind appears to be an alternative to limited liability, and gives the 
members, the company and, in fact, the creditors, an alternative to piercing the 
corporate veil.  In this regard, insurance would be sought to cover the amount of 
debt which the company cannot settle in the event of the veil being pierced, as 
opposed to members being held liable in their personal capacity. This argument is 
not without flaws, as the insurance company may stipulate that it will not honour the 
insurance policy in cases of fraud. Further, the perpetrators of the fraud may still be 
liable for criminal sanctions in such cases. 
 
7.8 Legislating to cure the problem – the solution? 
 
In the mid 1980’s, the Close Corporation Act gave effect to the statutory version of 
the doctrine of veil piercing.405  Section 65 of the Close Corporation Act provides 
that, where there is a gross abuse of the juristic personality of the corporation as a 
separate entity, the court can deem the corporation not to be a juristic person in 
respect of such obligations, liabilities or rights, or of such member or members of 
the corporation, as are specified in its declaration. 
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South Africa’s Close Corporation Act is regarded as being one of the very best in 
modern thinking.  Many of the issues in the Close Corporation Act are of relevance 
in company law and, accordingly, those issues included in the Close Corporation 
Act are often a good indication of what is to come in future versions of the 
Companies Act.  Consequently, because veil piercing was seen as being necessary 
for inclusion into the Close Corporation Act, it can be argued that there is a strong 
possibility that similar provisions will be included into the Companies Act 
(specifically having regard to the fact that there is currently a process under way for 
a complete overhaul of the Companies Act, in which it is expected to appear a 
provision dealing with veil piercing in circumstances of abuse of juristic personality).  
Larkin is of the view that veil piercing has been given a huge amount of credibility by 
its inclusion in the Close Corporation Act406, and that this indicates that the veil 
piercing doctrine is here to stay. 
 
Whilst having veil piercing included in statute provides for certain procedural 
advantages, as well as visibility of the doctrine, it also has its vices (in that the 
courts may adopt a formalistic, rigid approach by interpreting the provision in a very 
technical manner).407 
 
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Phillips408 the court held that it was 
unnecessary to pierce the corporate veil.409  The court stated that “only misuse or 
abuse of the principle of corporate personality warrants piercing the veil.”410  Larkin 
and Cassim note that the difficulty with this test is determining what it actually 
means.411  This is, however, similar to the approach adopted in the Close 
Corporation Act.  The concern with section 65 of the Close Corporation Act is that, 
although it gives the doctrine more force, the courts are still faced with the same 
troubling issues such as the requirements for an abuse that must be present.  Thus, 
the same problems which the courts have faced with the fraud category will arise 
under the Close Corporations Act, bringing little additional clarity or predictability to 
the application of the doctrine. 
 
If veil piercing is to be legislated in South Africa, then it appears to be useful to 
examine the position in the United States of America, in particular the Model 
Business Corporation Act Annotated which states that, “[u]nless otherwise provided 
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in the articles of incorporation, a member of a company is not personally liable for 
the acts or debts of the company except that he may become personally liable by 
reason of his own acts or conducts.”412  This, it is submitted, encapsulates limited 
liability, and the piercing of the corporate veil, as it should be.  Thus, members can 
be held liable for their own misconduct.  The question is thus not whether the 
members used the company as their “agent”, but rather whether the member 
himself/herself acted in such a manner that they should be held personally liable. 413  
 
It has been suggested that this will alter the jurisprudence of the veil piercing 
doctrine, as it will result in the adoption of a single set of statutory standards as to 
when limited liability should be discarded.  This will provide the necessary certainty 
in this area of law and will allow for uniformity when applying the veil piercing 
doctrine.414  It will also create a consistent test that will eliminate free-form decision-
making.415  
 
Accordingly, if this test is adopted, the loss of limited liability will result from the 
voluntary acts of the owner and therefore a member’s limited liability can be said to 
be waived by his/her actions.416  The test will result in attorneys being able to advise 
their clients that dishonest conduct in the conducting of their business is the only 
way that a member can be held personally liable.  If a business is conducted in an 
honest manner, one can be assured of the protection of statutory liability.417  Limited 
liability would be lost to the member, for example, if he/she acts fraudulently, 
renders services for less than a reasonable equivalent value or distributes money or 
other property to the member who then renders the company insolvent.418  The 
Model Business Corporation Act focuses on the behaviour of members that directly 
misleads creditors and where the member causes the entity to become insolvent.419  
 
The result of this test is rather significant, as it provides honest business owners 
with security because, if their affairs are conducted in an honest manner, they need 
not fear losing the protection of separate personality.  At the same time, it prevents 
the fraudulent business owners from hiding behind the shield of limited liability420 
and prevents them from making a mockery of the corner stone of our company law.  
                                               
411
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It is thus suggested that this is, in all likelihood, the most appropriate solution to the 
problems with the veil piercing doctrine (as articulated in this paper). 
 
Section 424 of the Companies Act in South Africa does not provide the above 
solution, as currently drafted, as only applies in circumstances where the member 
has carried on business with the intent to defraud creditors of the company or for 
any fraudulent purpose. 
 
7.9 Conclusion 
 
From the foregoing suggestions (ranging from the courts taking a different 
approach, legislation being created, the strict entity theory and insurance), it is 
apparent that veil piercing is not the only solution and that alternatives to veil 
piercing do exist.  The most appropriate route that our legal system should, it is 
submitted, take is to legislate and impose liability upon a person for their own 
misconduct (as is the position in the United States of America).  This will prevent 
the courts having to disrupt the very essence of our company law, that of the 
separate existence of the entity, while still being able to impose liability where it is 
due. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The doctrine of limited liability saw the introduction of the concept of the company as a 
separate legal entity, distinct from its members.  Few will disagree that limited liability of 
members is a cornerstone of any body of company law (including in South Africa) and to a 
large degree dictates the manner in which companies operate.  As has been discussed 
throughout this paper, the doctrine has various advantages and disadvantages.  On the one 
hand, by ring-fencing the liability of the corporate entity in the corporate entity itself, the risk 
undertaken by members is effectively limited to their capital investment, thereby 
encouraging investment and, in turn, economic growth.  This fosters a culture of 
entrepreneurship.  On the other hand, however, limited liability transfers much of the risk of 
doing business to the counterparty and has been said to encourage reckless governance 
and risk taking by members, with various costs arising therefrom.  Ceteris paribus, it would 
seem as though the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. 
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While limited liability is well established in our legal system, it cannot be regarded as being 
absolute.  An exception to limited liability is the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, which 
effectively disregards limited liability and imputes liability for the company to its members in 
certain circumstances.   
 
As has been discussed above, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is clearly in a 
desultory state.  Notwithstanding an almost universal recognition that limited liability should 
not be allowed to flourish unchecked and that under certain circumstances veil piercing is 
justified and necessary, the veil piercing doctrine remains underdeveloped and fraught with 
uncertainty.   
 
Decisions by our courts have been inconsistent and, because veil piercing cases are so 
highly fact specific, no concrete guidelines have been established as to when and how the 
veil may be pierced.  A further problem is that the courts seem particularly focused on the 
“categorisation approach” in ascertaining whether or not to pierce the corporate veil in each 
particular case.  A major problem arising from the implementation of the “categorisation 
approach” is that each of the categories have faults of their own.  A further problem with the 
“categorisation approach” is that, where the facts of a particular case do not fit neatly within 
one of the existing categories, the court will be unable to pierce the veil.  In addition, it has 
been argued that judges are ill equipped to deal with the intricacies of the suggested tests.  
The practical consequences of this, is that successful veil piercing claims tend to differ from 
unsuccessful claims, not only in degree but also in kind. 421  
 
The veil piercing doctrine also remains underdeveloped in legislation.  While certainty in 
respect of this doctrine could have been introduced by the legislature, our legislation has 
dealt with the veil piercing doctrine in a misguided manner and/or does not deal with this 
doctrine directly, allowing this area of law to fall within the domain of the judiciary (who, as 
mentioned above, have not dealt with it adequately).  
 
As a consequence of the aforementioned legislative deficiency and judicial uncertainty, 
business owners have no guidance in ascertaining what will or will not result in a loss of 
limited liability422 through the piercing of the corporate veil.  This has, in many instances, 
resulted in non-desirable consequences and additional expenses.  As such, it is no wonder 
that change in respect of this doctrine is desperately required. 
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With chaos like this, it is questionable why such a doctrine would remain in our company 
law, especially where it is evident from a host of cases and theories that similar relief can 
be provided through alternative remedies which do not undermine the principle of separate 
legal personality.  It is thus submitted that the courts should change the current approach in 
order to create certainty, predictability and a more sound company law.  It would appear 
though, for the time being at least, that the doctrine is here to stay.423  This is evident from 
the rigid Hulse-Reutter style approach that our judges now seem to be following. 
 
Alternatively, our legislature can elect to follow the approach in the United States of 
America, where legislation dictates that misconduct on the part of members will give rise to 
personal liability in respect of that member. This, it is submitted, encapsulates limited 
liability, and the piercing of the corporate veil, as it should be.  It has been suggested that 
this will alter the jurisprudence of the veil piercing doctrine, as it will result in the adoption of 
a single set of statutory standards as to when limited liability should be discarded.  This will 
provide the necessary certainty in this area of law and will allow for uniformity when 
applying the veil piercing doctrine.424  It will also create a consistent test that will eliminate 
free-form decision-making.425 The result of this test is rather significant, as it provides 
honest business owners with security because, if their affairs are conducted in an honest 
manner, they need not fear losing the protection of separate personality.  At the same time, 
it prevents the fraudulent business owners from hiding behind the shield of limited 
liability426. 
 
Notwithstanding the regrettable status quo in respect of the veil piercing doctrine, it is clear 
from this paper that there is still potential to salvage this area of law.  This will, however, 
require a change in policy by either the courts or the legislature. One can only hope that 
heed will be given to the sage advice of our learned academics, that the successes of other 
jurisdictions will be emulated and that alternative approaches affording similar relief will be 
adopted. 
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